John Grehan

Strictly a reference work. These are verbatim reprints of dispatches (OK, it’s English, so despatches) from English commanders in the World War II East African theater; from General Archibald Wavell from 1939 to 1940 (covering preparations for war and the response to the Italian invasion of British Somaliland a); Wavell again from 1940 to 1941 (covering the British invasions of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia); from General William Platt from 1941 to 1943 (covering the end of the Italian East African campaign and persuading the French in French Somaliland and Madagascar to join the Allies) and from Admiral E.N. Syfret, covering the naval aspects. The reports are quite detailed, with unit names, locations, dates, action reports, and everything else a military historian might want – except there are no maps, so unless you have separate maps of the Horn of Africa and Madagascar (ideally as they were in the 1940s) it’s not of much use for following the action. This is disappointing, since the campaign usually gets ignored or given cursory treatment in most WWII histories.

Still, there’s some interesting “military sociology” that can be extracted. In hindsight we know that the Italian armed forces performed poorly in WWII; however this wasn’t known at the time. Both English generals express modest surprise at Italian performance; it’s noted that Italian defensive positions were skillfully laid out and thoroughly equipped with mines, barbed wire and concrete emplacements but the Italians tended to hunker down in them and were outflanked by British mobile units. (The exception to this was the position at Keren in Eritrea, where the geography made it more or less impossible to outflank, resulting in a long and bloody battle before it was captured).

Another interesting observation was the ethnic makeup of the British army. Almost all the units that fought against the Italians were native Africans with English officers and NCOs: the King’s African Rifles (from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe). and regiments from Sudan, Nigeria and the Gold Coast (now Ghana). Ethiopians were first guerrillas fighting behind the lines (always referred to as “Ethiopian patriots”); later some were organized into formal military units. There were some units from South Africa involved; I assume these were all white although it’s never spelled out. The South African units were usually specialists – armored cars, artillery, and the South African Air Force. There were also some Indian troops. None of the English generals ever mention the racial makeup of units, probably assuming that it would be understood. There’s no overt racism against African troops, although in one case some surprise is expressed when an African unit preforms aggressively and successfully even though all its English officers and NCOs had been killed or wounded. In that regard in note that casualties among English officers and NCOs seem to be high; they were “leading from the front”. (I note President Obama’s paternal grandfather was in the King’s African Rifles during WWII, although as near as I can tell he didn’t join the unit until later and served in Burma, not the East African campaign).

The situation is a little different with respect to Ethiopians. The “patriot” guerillas were not under English command and the generals claim they could not be counted on to cooperate. However, Wavell does comment that Ethiopians fought well, even “recklessly”, once it was clear that the campaign was going to be successful. A major concern was fears for Italian civilians in conquered areas – the language is very discrete, of course, but there’s a definite undertone of black men, white women, and fates worse than death. In fact, the English used this idea as a lever to get Italian military to surrender, sending messages that they didn’t have the resources to protect Italian civilians unless Italian soldiers laid down their arms. (As it happened, although there were some incidents, the Ethiopians were much more civilized toward the Italians that the Italians had after they overran Ethiopia). The English field commanders come across as puzzled with regard to the Ethiopians – were they supposed to treat them as allies, as neutrals, or what? There’s quite a bit of frustration expressed over negotiations with Emperor Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian government; the generals seemed to want to treat Ethiopia as a colony. Considerable bickering ensued as the Ethiopians insisted on their rights. (For more about the Ethiopian campaign, see Lost Lions of Judah and Prevail)

Another interesting observation made by the English generals is the amount of development in the captured territory. The Italians had gone to considerable lengths to build factories and develop infrastructure; an English general commented that there were more miles of paved roads in Italian Ethiopia than in the all the English colonies adjacent combined.

The capture of Madagascar came about when Japan entered the war. The English were afraid Vichy would allow Japanese and/or German submarines to base there and wreak havoc with shipping in the Indian Ocean. The invasion is documented as very much a hastily conceived venture, with troops scraped up from here and there and ships not “combat loaded”; however after some fighting to preserve national honor the French came to terms (I expect the English, African, French, Senegalese and Malagasy soldiers and civilians killed were probably not consoled by ideas of national honor).

Military dispatches are not the place to find exciting writing, and the lack of maps greatly limits the utility of this fairly expensive volume. However, it’s interesting enough for what’s “written between the lines” and it deals with an aspect of WWII not handled well elsewhere.… (més)

Despatches from the Front, The Battle for Norway 1940 – 1942
Introduced and Compiled by John GREHAN and Martin MACE
Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military 2015
i – xii 174 pp ISBN 978-1-78346-2 322 (hbk)

This book is one of a series published recently by the same compilers, to which I have become a convert. I have found them increasingly useful for my research, and as a quick point of reference in respect of the campaigns they cover. This one also covers a campaign in which I have a particular interest, so is particularly relevant to me.

The book comprises six despatches, one by Lieutenant General MASSY that covers the two operations codenamed Maurice Force and Sickle Force in central Norway; the second covers the first and second naval battles of Narvik, in early April 1940. The third despatch was written by Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of Cork and Orrery, and has as two appendices, the dispatches those from Major General MACKESY and Lieutenant General AUCHINLECK, which cover the operations in Northern Norway around Narvik. The last three were written by Admiral TOVEY, to detail the operations on Kirkenes, and the raids on the Lofoten Islands and Vaagso Island in 1941. Each despatch is reprinted in its original format, and as such, they contain a wealth of information, including some orders of battle and casualty figures.

Apart from a short introduction, the compliers have not added any comment to the main content of the book. This does not detract from the purpose of the book, which remains true to the concept. It is not the type of book to read from cover to cover, it is the type of book to dip in and out of. It provides a consolidated resource for any student of the war in Norway from April 1940 until December 1941, therefore, I recommend it to anyone interested in the Second World War in this area.… (més)

Despatches from the Front, The Battle for Burma 1943 – 1945 From Kohima & Imphal Through To Victory
Introduced and Compiled by John GREHAN and Martin MACE
Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military 2015
i – xii 291 pp ISBN 978-1-78346-199-8 (hbk)

This book is one of a series published recently by the same compilers, to which I have become a convert. I have found them increasingly useful for my research, and as a quick point of reference in respect of the campaigns they cover. This one is particularly relevant to me, covering as it does the Army campaigns in Burma from November 1943 until August 1945.

The book comprises four despatches, two from General GIFFARD that cover the period from 16 November 1943 until 12 November 1944; one by Vice Admiral POWER covering the naval operations around Ramree Island in early 1945; and finally the despatch from Lieutenant General LESSE that covers 12 November 1944 until 15 August 1945. Each despatch is reprinted in its original format, and as such, they contain a wealth of information, including some orders of battle and casualty figures.

Apart from a short introduction, the compliers have not added any comment to the main content of the book. This does not detract from the purpose of the book, which remains true to the concept. It is not the type of book to read from cover to cover, it is the type of book to dip in and out of. It provides a consolidated resource for any student of the land war in Burma from November 1943 onwards, therefore, I recommend it to anyone interested in the Second World War in South-East Asia.… (més)

Despatches from the Front, The War in Italy 1943 - 1944
Introduced and Compiled by John GREHAN and Martin MACE
Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military 2014
i – xii 292 pp ISBN 978 1 78346 213 1 (hbk) £25.00

This book is one of a series published by Pen and Sword Military compiled by GREHAN and MACE. As it name suggests, this one includes four Despatches relating to the British involvement in the campaign in Sicily and Italy from July 1943 until December 1944. It does not cover the U.S. involvement in that campaign, and because General Mark CLARK assumed command of the Army Group in December 1944, it does not cover the final offensive other than in passing. The four despatches included are those of General ALEXANDER relating to the invasion of Sicily, that of Admiral CUNNINGHAM relating to the naval aspects of that invasion, CUNNINGHAM’s despatch on the landings at Salerno, and the main one, which is by ALEXANDER and covers the land campaign from September 1943 until December 1944.

The despatches are reproduced in their original form, with a short commentary by the compilers at the beginning of the book. The one on the Sicilian campaign is relatively short, in line with the campaign. The two naval ones bring a different perspective on these two landings, but that at Anzio is not included. The largest section is that covering the main campaign in Italy, up to the initial battle of the Gothic Line. ALEXANDER’s despatch is comprehensive, but covers the campaign from a strategic and operational perspective only. There are some useful appendices, including ten providing the outline orders of battle of the Allies and Axis forces at various times during the campaign.

In conclusion, this book falls short of providing a comprehensive account of the Italian campaign in Italy, omitting as it does the air campaign, the final offensive and naval operations other than the landings on Sicily and at Salerno. However, it is a useful account for students of the Italian campaign, giving as it does the account of the Army Group commander and his view of the events as they occurred.… (més)