Eric Dorn Brose

Where are the sound effects when you need them?

This review should start with a warning siren, because if you read the online descriptions, you'll think this is a history. It's only when you look at the title page that you'll read that it is a "novelistic history and Senecan tragedy." Which is bad enough, given that Seneca was given to ponderous blood-and-thunder tragedies. But on page 286, in the "Afterword on Historical Methodology," you'll read that "Death at Sea is nine parts history and only one part historical fiction."

The problem, of course, is that 10% fiction means that it is 100% unreliable, unless you know which parts are the 10% fiction. Which is not evident. To misquote the Apostle Paul, a little fiction fictionalizes the whole lump!

Of course, you may want your history fictionalized. I feel cheated, but your mileage may vary. I have to offer some other warnings, though: although the book is 294 pages, which sounds substantial, it's printed in what appears to be (very large and wide) 13 point type -- easy on the eyes, perhaps, but it means that that 294 pages would be only about 200 pages if ordinary 11 point type were used, and perhaps 170 if 10 point type were used. So it's a slim volume disguised as something bigger. And the type isn't a serif. It's not even an ordinary sans serif. It's a gothic, and a hypermodern one (Futura, maybe? -- there are no descenders on the lower case u's, for instance). The page color is bad and the type is eye-wearying; whoever designed this knew very little about typography. Even if you don't mind the novel part, you may want to read this in small doses. Me, if I want history, I'll read history, and if I want Seneca... I'll go try to sleep off whatever somebody slipped me that would make me want Seneca.… (més)

After reading many books on the Imperial German Army I was left with the impression that this army was the best trained, most advanced and best lead army in the world at the time. After reading this book my opinion has changed dramatically! As a result of the great success during the Wars of Unification (Denmark, Austria and France) the German Army appears to have gotten 'cocky'. There also developed an attitude of what worked to win the last war will be sufficient to win the next war(s). Consequently the various branches of the service became very defensive of their turf and traditions. For example, the cavalry did not want to give up the tactics of direct shock charges; scouting and screening flanks for the infantry was of no interest. They felt horse flesh and spirit would defeat machine guns and artillery (Sir Douglas Haig felt the same way). Infantry was not interested in machine guns; they too were reluctant to give up the tradition of attacking in closely formed columns regardless of machine guns and artillery fire. Field artillery felt superior, yet threatened by heavy artillery. Infantry did not want to wait for artillery support; Engineers were looked down upon. The officer corps was insulted when the granting of commissions was considered for those outside the aristocracy (resulting in a shortage of qualified candidates).

I could continue to give further examples,but I am sure the point has been made. This volume was an eye-opener for me to say the least. Up to almost of the eve of WWI the German Army was still fighting itself in terms of tactics and technology.

I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in military history, WWI or more specifically the German Army. It is well written, well documented, and very interesting. Great work by Eric Dorn Brose!!!!… (més)