Terence Cuneo (1)

An elegant 'core argument' in defence of moral facts given parity between them and similarly normative epistemic facts, supported by imposing pyramids of justification for the contentious premisses against possible challenges from expressivists and others: incisive, erudite, and wholly unsuitable for the casual reader.

Writing a full-length review for Philosophical Writings, I found myself mostly inclined to complain about the index, and the number of Cuneo's coinages it omits, making it unnecessarily difficult to keep track of an elaborate argument. I also thought Cuneo glossed over the question of what moral facts are not only possible but actual; he seems to think that if moral language looks truth-apt after all, then all of it must plainly be supported by matters of fact. Within his chosen terms of reference, however, he goes about solidifying support for moral realism with formidable thoroughness.… (més)