David Ray Griffin
Autor/a de The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11
Sobre l'autor
David Ray Griffin is Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology, Emeritus, Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Graduate University (1973-2004); Co-Director, Center for Process Studies. He edited the SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought (1987-2004), which published 31 volumes. mostra'n més He has written 30 books, edited 13 books, and authored 250 articles and chapters. His most recent books are Bush and Cheney: How They Ruined America and the World and Unprecedented: Can Humanity Survive the CO2 Crisis? mostra'n menys
Crèdit de la imatge: Photo by user Micheltomli / English Wikipedia
Obres de David Ray Griffin
The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11 (2004) 287 exemplars
Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory (2007) 88 exemplars
The American Empire and the Commonwealth of God: A Political, Economic, Religious Statement (2006) — Autor — 39 exemplars
Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee's Plan to Undermine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory (2010) 30 exemplars
Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine and Process Philosophy (1985) — Editor — 30 exemplars
The Mysterious Collapse of World Trade Center 7: Why the Final Official Report About 9/11 Is Unscientific and False (2005) 29 exemplars
Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions (Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought) (1988) 23 exemplars
Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for Its Contemporary Relevance (2007) 18 exemplars
Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (1992) 16 exemplars
Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy, and Art (1990) — Editor — 15 exemplars
Panentheism and Scientific Naturalism: Rethinking Evil, Morality, Religious Experience, Religious Pluralism, and the… (2014) 6 exemplars
Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis: Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision (1993) 4 exemplars
9/11: The Myth & the Reality 2 exemplars
Das Neue Pearl Harbor - Band 2 (Kommentar zu Band 1): Der 11. September - Vertuschung und Enthüllung 1 exemplars
Das Neue Pearl Harbor - Band 1: Beunruhigende Fragen zur Bush-Regierung und zum 11. September 1 exemplars
Le Procès du 11 Septembre ou le 11 Septembre à l'épreuve des faits : La vérité sur l'effondrement des 3 tours du… (2006) 1 exemplars
Kognitive Infiltration: Zersetzung von Oppositionsgruppen am Beispiel des 11. September (2018) 1 exemplars
The New Pearl Harbor Revisited 1 exemplars
9/11: Ten Years of Deception 1 exemplars
Obres associades
Etiquetat
Coneixement comú
- Data de naixement
- 1939-08-08
- Gènere
- male
- Nacionalitat
- USA
- Lloc de naixement
- Wilbur, Washington, USA
- Llocs de residència
- Santa Barbara, California, USA
- Educació
- University of Oregon
Claremont Graduate University (PhD, 1970) - Professions
- Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology
political writer - Organitzacions
- Claremont Graduate School
Membres
Ressenyes
Llistes
Premis
Potser també t'agrada
Autors associats
Estadístiques
- Obres
- 55
- També de
- 6
- Membres
- 1,377
- Popularitat
- #18,670
- Valoració
- 4.1
- Ressenyes
- 20
- ISBN
- 114
- Llengües
- 7
- Preferit
- 4
If I believed in a soul, this would crush it. I thought of “Dawkins’ Law of the Conservation of Difficulty”, which “ states that obscurantism in an academic subject expands to fill the vacuum of its intrinsic simplicity. Physics is a genuinely difficult and profound subject, so physicists need to – and do – work hard to make their language as simple as possible (‘but no simpler,’ rightly insisted Einstein). Other academics – some would point the finger at continental schools of literary criticism and social science – suffer from what Peter Medawar (I think) called Physics Envy. They want to be thought profound, but their subject is actually rather easy and shallow, so they have to language it up to redress the balance.”
Okay, the problem isn’t simple, but oh, my, philosophers love to language up their arguments. I don’t recommend engaging the author in a coffee shop debate without the help of Will Hunting. I also thought of Paul Dirac: “In science one tries to tell people, in such a way as to be understood by everyone, something that no one ever knew before. But in poetry, it's the exact opposite.” Substitute philosophy for poetry and Bob’s your uncle.
This won’t help many understand or unsnarl the world-knot. Dr. Griffin did no favors to the reader. His answer to the problem is something he calls panexperialentialism and the tortuous path he took to getting to it rumbles over philosophers who dream up unanswerable questions and then what they think are answers to them. He also apparently believed in paranormal nonsense (and 9/11 conspiracies, but that wasn’t part of this.)
You can read the book online for free here
I stopped highlighting and making notes when I realized that his arguments were no help, but here are some:
P241/2 Kim has been led to a dead end because, correctly seeing that a nonreductive materialism is impossible, he believes that there are only three other options, all of which are extremely problematic: reductive materialism, which reduces the psychological to the physical (as conventionally understood); eliminative materialism, which, realizing that reduction is impossible, excludes the psychological from its ontology; and ontological dualism, which rejects physicalism altogether. I have proposed a fourth option: a nonreductive, panexperientialist physicalism.
P9 This confusion is so serious because Problem 1 is based on a metaphysical assumption that is pure supposition, and one that, on reflection, is revealed to be dubious. After all, an amoeba, like a neuron, is a single-celled organism, and an amoeba shows signs of spontaneity suggestive of some slight degree of experience. If amoebas might have experience, why might not neurons in the brain have experience as well?
P12 The way these two types of thinkers [dualists and materialists] weigh data and arguments may at least be significantly influenced by their respective wishes and fears. In this way, the wish (or the fear) may be the parent of the paradigm.
P12 "The deepest motivation of materialism," Searle suggests, "is simply a terror of consciousness" with its "essentially terrifying feature of subjectivity," which most materialists think to be "inconsistent with their conception of what the world must be like"
{project, much? There is nothing terrifying about consciousness. This alone slides him into the fringe category.}
P15 Philosophers as well as scientists have failed to distinguish between the kind of common sense that science can sensibly reject and the kind that it cannot.
P23 When some principles are stated, they are usually scattered throughout the writing, making criticism difficult. Mutual criticism is especially important because even when principles are explicitly formulated, they are often formulated ambiguously.
P26 Some conscious states may be partly caused by previous conscious states (as prima facie seems to be the case in memory); some conscious states may be partially caused by influences that have not been transmitted through the brain (as seems to be the case in moral, logical, and religious experience, not to mention clairvoyance and telepathy);…
{um… best not to mention quackery at all}
P28 1. We should accept only a realistic theory about the "physical world."
a . This substantive principle rules out all idealisms that deny full-fledged actuality to the "physical world," making its reality dependent on its being perceived or conceived by mind.
P30 4. Our theory should be naturalistic .
a . This substantive regulative principle, which has recently been insisted on strongly by McGinn, entails not only the rejection of any explicit supernaturalism, according to which the natural causal nexus is said to be interrupted; it also entails the rejection of any doctrine that even implies the need for supernatural intervention.
{however, he goes off the edge with…}
d . Naturalism also does not necessarily rule out seemingly "paranormal" types of causal influence, such as extrasensory perception and psychokinesis. That would be the case if paranormal events were understood to be "miracles" involving interruptions of fundamental causal principles, but they need not be (and by parapsychologists usually are not) so understood.
P42 1. In mathematical and logical experience, the mind seems to be in touch with entities that are not only nonphysical but even nonactual, which the brain's sensory organs are not suited to perceive. Of course, under the pressure of a materialistic worldview—for example, McGinn says that to affirm a causal relation between abstract entities and human minds would be to affirm a nonnatural, even "funny," kind of causation
P43/44 6. There is considerable evidence, some of it of quite high quality and some of it vouchsafed by people of otherwise undoubted intelligence and honesty, for telepathy and clairvoyance. Current writers about the mind-body relation typically reject the possibility of extrasensory perception in this sense. But their rejections are usually a priori; few of them show signs of serious grappling with the evidence. Some philosophers and scientists who have seriously studied the evidence, such as [long list] became convinced (some of them, such as Freud, much against their wills) that these experiences sometimes really do involve nonsensory perception.
P45 I have, probably to the annoyance of some readers, listed several kinds of data that are especially difficult for a materialistic view of the mind to accommodate. I have done this deliberately, because most recent discussions, among both scientists and philosophers, have weighted the evidence one-sidedly in favor of evidence meant to be embarrassing to views that distinguish mind from brain, especially those that attribute some autonomous powers to the mind. […] In the current discussion, the tendency has been to stress the evidence that supports a materialistic view and then to look only at that part of the contrary evidence, such as consciousness itself, that is too obvious to everyone to be completely ignored. My discussion has sought to redress the imbalance.
It is very difficult, of course, for philosophers and scientists who have been socialized into one worldview to take seriously data that are, from that perspective, not respectable.[…] In any case, we need a theory that takes account of all the relevant facts—those that have been regarded as supportive of materialism, those that have been regarded as supportive of dualism, and those that may count against both materialism and dualism.
P54 In short, the datum of freedom, like the data of the unity of experience
and the unity of our bodily behavior, favors dualism over materialism—or at least would if the problems of discontinuity and dualistic interaction could be ignored.
{oh, those little things? Pshaw! We obviously aren’t meant to understand them. (Yes, sarcasm)}
P59 6. A related problem for materialists, given the virtual necessity of their restricting perception to that which occurs through the physical sensory organs, is the impressive evidence for extrasensory perception, in the sense of telepathy and clairvoyance.
{impressive? Unreal, this guy.}… (més)