John Keegan (1) (1934–2012)
Autor/a de The First World War
Per altres autors anomenats John Keegan, vegeu la pàgina de desambiguació.
Sobre l'autor
John Keegan, May 15, 1934 - August 2, 2012 John Keegan was born in London, England on May 15, 1934. He received a degree in history from Balliol College, Oxford in 1953. After graduation, he went to the United States on a grant to study the Civil War. When he returned to London, he wrote political mostra'n més reports for the United States Embassy and in 1960 was appointed as a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England, a post he held for 25 years. During this time he also held visiting professorships at Princeton University and Vassar College. In 1997, he began working for the Daily Telegraph as a defense correspondent and then military affairs editor. He also contributed to the American website National Review Online. During his lifetime, he wrote more than 20 books about military history, the majority of which focus on warfare from the 14th to the 21st centuries. His works included Barbarossa: Invasion of Russia, The Face of Battle, A History of Warfare, Who Was Who in World War II, The Second World War, The American Civil War, The Mask of Command, and The Iraq War. He was knighted in 2000. He died on August 2, 2012 at age of 78. (Bowker Author Biography) mostra'n menys
Crèdit de la imatge: Jerry Bauer
Obres de John Keegan
Opening moves: August 1914 (Ballantine's illustrated history of the violent century. Campaign book, no. 19) (1605) 79 exemplars
The Wall Chart of World War II: A Chronological Presentation of the War that Changed the World (1991) 14 exemplars
The American Civil War: A Military History [Abridged 8-CD Set] (AUDIO CD/AUDIO BOOK) (2009) 2 exemplars
Anzio 1 exemplars
The Military Geography of the American Civil War 1 exemplars
H24: La Iseconda guerra mondiale 1 exemplars
Obres associades
What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been (1999) — Col·laborador — 1,736 exemplars
The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (1989) — Introducció, algunes edicions — 556 exemplars
Booknotes: America's Finest Authors on Reading, Writing, and the Power of Ideas (1997) — Col·laborador — 422 exemplars
The Art of War (Smithsonian History of Warfare): War and Military Thought (2000) — Editor, algunes edicions — 220 exemplars
This is Berlin. Reporting from Nazi Germany 1938-40 (1999) — Introducció, algunes edicions — 172 exemplars
Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (1996) — Pròleg, algunes edicions — 57 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Winter 1989 (1988) — Author "Jutland" — 27 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Spring 1996 (1996) — Author "The View From Kitty Hawk" — 26 exemplars
A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (1985) — Pròleg — 20 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Autumn 1988 (1988) — Author "An Empty Ocean" — 20 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Spring 1998 (1998) — Author "How Hitler Could Have Won in 1941" — 14 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Winter 1993 (1992) — Author "The Parameters of Warfare" and "The Most-Fought-Over City" — 13 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Winter 1990 (1989) — Author "Berlin" — 12 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Summer 1999 (1999) — Author "The Breaking of Armies" — 11 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Autumn 2003 (2003) — Author "Nelson's Pursuit of Napoleon" — 7 exemplars
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History — Autumn 2009 (2009) — Author "Reinventing the Battlefield" — 5 exemplars
Etiquetat
Coneixement comú
- Nom oficial
- Keegan, John Desmond Patrick
- Data de naixement
- 1934-05-15
- Data de defunció
- 2012-08-02
- Gènere
- male
- Nacionalitat
- UK
- País (per posar en el mapa)
- UK
- Lloc de naixement
- Clapham, London, England, UK
- Lloc de defunció
- Kilmington, Wiltshire, England, UK
- Llocs de residència
- Kilmington, Wiltshire, England, UK
- Educació
- Wimbledon College
King's College, Taunton
Balliol College, Oxford - Professions
- editor
journalist
historian
university professor - Relacions
- Everett, Susanne (wife)
Keen, Maurice (brother-in-law) - Organitzacions
- Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Daily Telegraph
National Review - Premis i honors
- Samuel Eliot Morison Prize (1996)
Officer of the Order of the British Empire (1991)
Knight Bachelor (2000)
BBC Reith Lecturer (1998)
Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature (1986) - Biografia breu
- Sir John Keegan is a famed British military historian, lecturer, writer, and journalist who has published more than 20 books on combats between the 14th and 21st centuries, especially World War II. He was born in London to a family of Irish Catholic extraction. The long-term effects of a serious illness made him unfit for military service, and the timing of his birth made him too young to serve in World War II, as he mentions ironically in his work, given his profession and interest. Following his graduation from Oxford, he worked for a few years at the American Embassy in London. In 1960 he was appointed to a lectureship in Military History at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the training establishment for officers of the British Army. Holding the post for 26 years, he became senior lecturer in military history. During this period, he also held a visiting professorship at Princeton University and was Delmas Distinguished Professor of History at Vassar College. In 1986, Keegan joined the Daily Telegraph as a defence correspondent and rose to become defence editor, also writing for the American conservative website National Review Online. In 1998 he wrote and presented the BBC's Reith Lectures, entitled "War in our World." Many of his books are bestsellers.
Membres
Ressenyes
The First World War de John Keegan
It is difficult to put together a single volume history of the First World War but this is one of the good ones that I can recommend to someone just wanting to get into the subject.
Em Inteligência na guerra, o historiador militar John Keegan concentra sua atenção - e a do leitor - na arte e na ciência de trabalhar com a informação em circunstâncias conflitivas. Essa área, conhecida como "inteligência", abrange desde aspectos "românticos" - associados às atividades de espiões, agentes duplos e traidores - até dados técnicos como radiação eletromagnética, escuta de som, observação por satélite e detecção de vestígios nucleares. Num relato acessível e interessante, Keegan revela episódios das guerras dos últimos séculos para ilustrar as complexidades inerentes às batalhas da inteligência. Examina, por exemplo, a Primeira Guerra (que trouxe o rádio e a rádio-escuta para o campo de batalha), a Segunda Guerra (caracterizada por extraordinário progresso técnico no campo militar e no da inteligência) e ações bélicas mais recentes, como a Guerra das Malvinas e a atual guerra contra o terrorismo. O autor demonstra que a inteligência, essencial para vencer uma guerra, não é suficiente em si mesma: o domínio do uso da força e fatores como rapidez de decisão, firmeza de propósito e bravura continuam sendo decisivos.… (més)
You need maps if you are going to read this. You REALLY need maps.
This is actually my third time reading this audio book. I read it for the second time more than a year ago. As many times as I have listened to Simon Preble read this book now, I still feel that there is too much detailed information for me to get as much out of listening to this book as I might get from eyeballing the text. But it is not only the amount of information that gets to me so much as the weight of it in terms of the amount of material, the vastness of the regions involved and the staggering loss of life. Countries lost ten, thirteen, or seventeen percent of their young men. These casualties numbered in the millions for some nations. Where they numbered in the hundreds of thousands, it is only because these were small countries to begin with or, as in the case of the Turks, because they just never kept good count of their losses.
The author's description of the war as tragic and unnecessary is brought home by his description of the steps that led to it. Austria and Russia share equal blame for being slaves to treaties that they could have ignored. Competing factions in Germany either wanted war or wanted to avoid it; if only cooler heads had won the day. But they did not. And so, the Schlieffen plan--a military plan designed by Count Alfred von Schlieffen, a field marshal who died a year before the war began, was brought out and handed to Helmuth von Moltke, the son of his namesake who had conquered France for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and incidentally for the first Kaiser Wilhelm, back in 1870, but Moltke the Younger was not his father and he changed Schlieffen's plan in ways that put the brunt of his attack into what Schlieffen had intended as a feint, while turning the part of the attack that was supposed to be the main thrust into a feint. Keegan acknowledges this at one point, but mainly seems to think that the plan was poor to begin with. Schlieffen himself, says Keegan, thought that the material logistics required to make his plan work could not be satisfactorily organized and coordinated.
The massive technology brought to bear by each side on the other was monumental. Two kinds of gas warfare were developed and used. Huge guns with distant ranges, heavy machine guns, the first use of tank warfare, all merged together in the First World War, but communications were still backward and the generals often had no way of coordinating attacks except with the low tech expediant of having soldiers run from one position to another carrying handwritten messages. (This was the job of Cpl. Adolf Hitler who is mentioned once in passing when describing his Bavarian unit's engagement near Ypres.)
But 1914 is rightly considered the end of the "long 19th century" as conceived by world historians. (The long 19th runs from 1750 to 1914.) The ninteenth century was not quite over as troops initially marched off to war with equipment that would be rendered antique by the war's end. Consider the tank, which had not gotten the kinks out yet and tended to mire in mud. Late in the war, when they were used on a battlefield made of dry, chalky soil, they nearly turned the tide but were nevertheless backed up by cavalry--men on actual horses.
Keegan reminds us that this war really was a world war: the Allies--who included Italy and Japan--took most of Germany's colonies from her in Africa and the Pacific. A naval battle was fought off the coast of South America. As it would again in World War Two, Germany fought the French and British (and later the Americans) on the western front and the Russians on the eastern.
The French and Austrians--both brought to heel by Germany in the mid-nineteenth century--actually started out well in the First World War, but both eventually foundered. The French lost too many men and were forced by the Germans to fight alone as the Germans divided the allies in hope of thereby conquering. The Austrians fought the Italians with some success but the Russians less successfully and were weakened to the point where the Germans had to take the lead militarily.
Stalemate was the theme of the war, especially on the western front where the battle zone became almost rigidly fixed, shifting only slightly from time to time, while a few miles from the war zone the civilians lived in relative peace. There were places on the eastern front where this happened to some extent, as well.
After its Austrian ally collapsed, Germany was left alone to fight the world, and it is no wonder that General Erich Ludendorff concluded that there was no way for Germany to win (even though he later subscribed to the myth that Germany only lost because politicians stabbed the army in the back).
Keegan ends by pointing to the aftermath of the war. The Second World War was a continuation of the first, he says. Those who went home after the war often harbored thoughts of revenge. The Allies took revenge on the Central Powers by forcing them to put up with impossible terms including admitting to having caused the war and paying exorbitant reparations, the loss of territory and the dismantling of the military, the blockade of German ports. The Austrian Empire was divided into several new countries and German cities were taken over by Bolsheviks. Adolf Hitler gave voice to the German mood when he called for rejection of the Allied terms and their systematic undermining until Germany was a world power once again, only to plunge once more into world war.… (més)
The author's description of the war as tragic and unnecessary is brought home by his description of the steps that led to it. Austria and Russia share equal blame for being slaves to treaties that they could have ignored. Competing factions in Germany either wanted war or wanted to avoid it; if only cooler heads had won the day. But they did not. And so, the Schlieffen plan--a military plan designed by Count Alfred von Schlieffen, a field marshal who died a year before the war began, was brought out and handed to Helmuth von Moltke, the son of his namesake who had conquered France for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and incidentally for the first Kaiser Wilhelm, back in 1870, but Moltke the Younger was not his father and he changed Schlieffen's plan in ways that put the brunt of his attack into what Schlieffen had intended as a feint, while turning the part of the attack that was supposed to be the main thrust into a feint. Keegan acknowledges this at one point, but mainly seems to think that the plan was poor to begin with. Schlieffen himself, says Keegan, thought that the material logistics required to make his plan work could not be satisfactorily organized and coordinated.
The massive technology brought to bear by each side on the other was monumental. Two kinds of gas warfare were developed and used. Huge guns with distant ranges, heavy machine guns, the first use of tank warfare, all merged together in the First World War, but communications were still backward and the generals often had no way of coordinating attacks except with the low tech expediant of having soldiers run from one position to another carrying handwritten messages. (This was the job of Cpl. Adolf Hitler who is mentioned once in passing when describing his Bavarian unit's engagement near Ypres.)
But 1914 is rightly considered the end of the "long 19th century" as conceived by world historians. (The long 19th runs from 1750 to 1914.) The ninteenth century was not quite over as troops initially marched off to war with equipment that would be rendered antique by the war's end. Consider the tank, which had not gotten the kinks out yet and tended to mire in mud. Late in the war, when they were used on a battlefield made of dry, chalky soil, they nearly turned the tide but were nevertheless backed up by cavalry--men on actual horses.
Keegan reminds us that this war really was a world war: the Allies--who included Italy and Japan--took most of Germany's colonies from her in Africa and the Pacific. A naval battle was fought off the coast of South America. As it would again in World War Two, Germany fought the French and British (and later the Americans) on the western front and the Russians on the eastern.
The French and Austrians--both brought to heel by Germany in the mid-nineteenth century--actually started out well in the First World War, but both eventually foundered. The French lost too many men and were forced by the Germans to fight alone as the Germans divided the allies in hope of thereby conquering. The Austrians fought the Italians with some success but the Russians less successfully and were weakened to the point where the Germans had to take the lead militarily.
Stalemate was the theme of the war, especially on the western front where the battle zone became almost rigidly fixed, shifting only slightly from time to time, while a few miles from the war zone the civilians lived in relative peace. There were places on the eastern front where this happened to some extent, as well.
After its Austrian ally collapsed, Germany was left alone to fight the world, and it is no wonder that General Erich Ludendorff concluded that there was no way for Germany to win (even though he later subscribed to the myth that Germany only lost because politicians stabbed the army in the back).
Keegan ends by pointing to the aftermath of the war. The Second World War was a continuation of the first, he says. Those who went home after the war often harbored thoughts of revenge. The Allies took revenge on the Central Powers by forcing them to put up with impossible terms including admitting to having caused the war and paying exorbitant reparations, the loss of territory and the dismantling of the military, the blockade of German ports. The Austrian Empire was divided into several new countries and German cities were taken over by Bolsheviks. Adolf Hitler gave voice to the German mood when he called for rejection of the Allied terms and their systematic undermining until Germany was a world power once again, only to plunge once more into world war.… (més)
Llistes
Big History (1)
Premis
Potser també t'agrada
Autors associats
Estadístiques
- Obres
- 52
- També de
- 29
- Membres
- 19,635
- Popularitat
- #1,107
- Valoració
- 3.8
- Ressenyes
- 206
- ISBN
- 460
- Llengües
- 19
- Preferit
- 3
- Pedres de toc
- 256
