Aquest tema està marcat com "inactiu": L'últim missatge és de fa més de 90 dies. Podeu revifar-lo enviant una resposta.
Have just finished 'THE MEN WHO KILLED THE LUFTWAFFE; The U.S. Army Air Forces against Germany in World War II' (2010) (978-0-8117-0659-9), and must admit to enjoying it, despite the well-trodden ground. It is a well paced mix of combat missions and strategic concepts being made to work. The most telling comment was made after the war was by General Adolf Galland, commander of German Fighter Forces, that if the Allied Air Offensive against German fuel production and distribution systems had begun a year earlier, the war might have been ended up to six months earlier. The essential point is that the Germans were losing the the ability to distribute the fuel available because so many locomotives, tank rail cars and rail-car repair facilities had been damaged or destroyed that even what fuel was available could not be moved to where it was needed in time to have maximum effect on the combat situation. This means that the strategic goals of the Allied Air Forces were directed against targets which had much less effect on immediate combat operations, especially the ability of German forces to initiate a major counteroffensive, such as the 'Battle of the Bulge' in December of 1944, which delayed the allied advance by as much as two months.
Why not leave a review on the work record? No one's done one yet. :)