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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,…
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Authorized Edition: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (edició 2011)

de Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

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From the Publisher: In the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, the President signed into law on May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, creating the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Commission was established to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." The 10 members of the bi-partisan Commission, prominent private citizens with significant experience in banking, market regulation, taxation, finance, economics, housing, and consumer protection, were appointed by Congress on July 15, 2009. The Chair, Phil Angelides, and Vice Chair, Bill Thomas, were selected jointly by the House and Senate Majority and Minority Leadership. The FCIC is charged with conducting a comprehensive examination of 22 specific and substantive areas of inquiry related to the financial crisis. These include: fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud and abuse towards consumers in the mortgage sector; Federal and State financial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced, or failed to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements; the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments; monetary policy and the availability and terms of credit; accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles; tax treatment of financial products and investments; capital requirements and regulations on leverage and liquidity, including the capital structures of regulated and non-regulated financial entities; credit rating agencies in the financial system, including, reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions and Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the use of credit ratings in the securitization markets; lending practices and securitization, including the originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and transferring risk; affiliations between insured depository institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of nonbanking companies; the concept that certain institutions are 'too-big-to-fail' and its impact on market expectations; corporate governance, including the impact of company conversions from partnerships to corporations; compensation structures; changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation for others with similar skill sets in the labor market; the legal and regulatory structure of the United States housing market; derivatives and unregulated financial products and practices, including credit default swaps; short-selling; financial institution reliance on numerical models, including risk models and credit ratings; the legal and regulatory structure governing financial institutions, including the extent to which the structure creates the opportunity for financial institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage; the legal and regulatory structure governing investor and mortgagor protection; financial institutions and government-sponsored enterprises; and the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial institutions. The Commission is called upon to examine the causes of major financial institutions which failed, or were likely to have failed, had they not received exceptional government assistance. In its work, the Commission is authorized to hold hearings; issue subpoenas either for witness testimony or documents; and refer to the Attorney General or the appropriate state Attorney General any person who may have violated U.S. law in relation to the financial crisis.… (més)
Membre:neilstrandberg
Títol:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Authorized Edition: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
Autors:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Informació:PublicAffairs (2011), Edition: 1, Paperback, 576 pages
Col·leccions:La teva biblioteca
Valoració:*****
Etiquetes:Cap

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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Authorized Edition: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States de Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

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At the back of the book is a page that says the index is available online from the publisher. It is no longer available. We book buyers got cheated.
  johnclaydon | Feb 18, 2016 |
The short story of The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report is that some rather intelligent and sophisticated people got in over their heads in an attempt to make a lot of money that eventually backfired and nearly took down the entire world economy.

The longish story is that not long after September 11 a credit bubble began forming in the U.S. as a result of the Federal Reserve Bank's efforts to stave off a recession. This credit bubble eventually morphed into a housing bubble after millions of subprime mortgages were extended starting around 2005 based on a faulty assumption that house prices could only continue to go up or that any fall in house prices would be localized to just a few locations. The negative ramifications of the bursting of the housing bubble were subsequently spread throughout the economy via the process of securitization of mortgages and the issuance of collateralized debt obligations, repurchase agreements, and derivatives that were facilitated by off-balance sheet investment vehicles. And all the while that this was going on the state and federal regulatory agencies that were supposed to be making sure nothing bad happened were effectively asleep at the wheel or, even worse, knew what was going on but did not consider it to be dangerous.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) claims that this was an avoidable situation. In a sense the FCIC commissioners are right. The specific causes of the crisis could have been avoided. But, in another sense, that is wrong, and this is where I think the FCIC report comes up short. In a large sense, this report gets lost in the weeds of details instead of focusing on the real reason why the crisis occurred: complexity. The U.S. financial system and the larger economy are simply too complex for any group of people, no matter how smart, to "regulate" as if they were merely watches that need periodic winding to make them run smoothly. Given the overwhelming complexity of the financial system, financial crises are inevitable. The only question, then, is how often do they occur and whether their occurrence bleeds into and causes major problems for the larger economy.

As such, what policymakers should be doing is not trying to figure out how to stop financial crises from occurring, which is the ultimate goal of this report, but instead trying to figure out how to keep financial crises from spreading to the larger economy. That is, they should be trying to figure out how to keep illnesses on Wall Street from spreading to Main Street. It might not be possible to do so, but the FCIC report provides a pretty good history of why we should at least try. ( )
1 vota Bretzky1 | Jun 2, 2012 |
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From the Publisher: In the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression, the President signed into law on May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, creating the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Commission was established to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." The 10 members of the bi-partisan Commission, prominent private citizens with significant experience in banking, market regulation, taxation, finance, economics, housing, and consumer protection, were appointed by Congress on July 15, 2009. The Chair, Phil Angelides, and Vice Chair, Bill Thomas, were selected jointly by the House and Senate Majority and Minority Leadership. The FCIC is charged with conducting a comprehensive examination of 22 specific and substantive areas of inquiry related to the financial crisis. These include: fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud and abuse towards consumers in the mortgage sector; Federal and State financial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced, or failed to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements; the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments; monetary policy and the availability and terms of credit; accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles; tax treatment of financial products and investments; capital requirements and regulations on leverage and liquidity, including the capital structures of regulated and non-regulated financial entities; credit rating agencies in the financial system, including, reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions and Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the use of credit ratings in the securitization markets; lending practices and securitization, including the originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and transferring risk; affiliations between insured depository institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of nonbanking companies; the concept that certain institutions are 'too-big-to-fail' and its impact on market expectations; corporate governance, including the impact of company conversions from partnerships to corporations; compensation structures; changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation for others with similar skill sets in the labor market; the legal and regulatory structure of the United States housing market; derivatives and unregulated financial products and practices, including credit default swaps; short-selling; financial institution reliance on numerical models, including risk models and credit ratings; the legal and regulatory structure governing financial institutions, including the extent to which the structure creates the opportunity for financial institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage; the legal and regulatory structure governing investor and mortgagor protection; financial institutions and government-sponsored enterprises; and the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial institutions. The Commission is called upon to examine the causes of major financial institutions which failed, or were likely to have failed, had they not received exceptional government assistance. In its work, the Commission is authorized to hold hearings; issue subpoenas either for witness testimony or documents; and refer to the Attorney General or the appropriate state Attorney General any person who may have violated U.S. law in relation to the financial crisis.

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