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Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: ledge; and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge. 11. Besides truth taken in the strict Moral and sense before-mentioned, there are other metaphy- sorts of truth; as, 1. Moral truth, which is sical truth- speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with a name to it. But these considerations of truth either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, jt may suffice here only to have mentioned them. CHAPTER VI. Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty, . 1. Though the examining and judg- Treating of ing of ideas by themselves, their names words ne- being quite laid aside, be the best and Jowlede surest way to clear and distinct know- ledge; yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it chapter{{Section 4is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one withoi explaining the other. Gener...… (més)
Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: ledge; and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge. 11. Besides truth taken in the strict Moral and sense before-mentioned, there are other metaphy- sorts of truth; as, 1. Moral truth, which is sical truth- speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with a name to it. But these considerations of truth either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, jt may suffice here only to have mentioned them. CHAPTER VI. Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty, . 1. Though the examining and judg- Treating of ing of ideas by themselves, their names words ne- being quite laid aside, be the best and Jowlede surest way to clear and distinct know- ledge; yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it chapter{{Section 4is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one withoi explaining the other. Gener...