I'm so glad this is over. This book was long and tedious. The main theme, repeated and repeated is that FDR and Leahy were pals--that fact affected American policy during WWII. I can't attest to the accuracy of statements in the book, but it's my opinion that the author's bent toward Naval forces detracts significantly. For example, he does not point out that the capture of the Marianas Islands enabled use of USAAF B-29s against Japan. 19 hours long, this was too long. ( )

While I've been aware of Adm. William Leahy for a long time, the reality that he's gone down in history as one of those classic grey eminences who had their fingers in every pie, but whose direct influence was not obvious, meant that it was hard to judge what he was really about. Phillips O'Brien is on a mission to change that perception, as the title of this book makes clear, to argue that Leahy was the predominant strategist in FDR's White House, and someone who generally made good choices. To a large degree this work is a parable of international relations and security policy, as O'Brien is determined to present Leahy as an exemplar of the responsible realist, as compared to idealists who talked a good line, but were not prepared to provide the foundations of power to back up their stands, or the practitioners of the "American way of war," with their obsession of closing with the enemy in the most direct way possible, to gain a main force victory (whether it made sense or not). It's clear to me that O'Brien is using the past to criticize the way U.S. governments have been pursuing policy in the post-1945 period.

So, do I think that O'Brien succeeded in his mission? To a large degree, yes. However, I have issues here that prevent me from being a whole-hearted enthusiast for this biography. First off, I tripped over a couple of dumb mistakes in this work, such as O'Brien's claim that only three examples of the "Iowa" class battleships were completed, or that FDR's presidential yacht "Potomac" had side-wheel propulsion. Two, while one can never overlook that the office politics in FDR's White House are really weird from a contemporary perspective, I do get the impression that O'Brien is playing up these matters too much, so as to appeal to a popular audience; I don't really care whether Princess Martha of Norway was FDR's mistress or not. Three, and probably most importantly, O'Brien does swing a big ax, and seems to really have it in for General George Marshall to a degree that almost seems personal; this is keeping in mind that Marshall's reputation probably could stand to be revisited.

All that being said, would I recommend this book? With reservations, as a good biography of Leahy, yes. As a critique of American security policy and diplomacy? Well, there are some good points here, but O'Brien is too polemical for his own good. I would read another work by the man though. ( )