Mjög áhugaverð yfirferð yfir innrás Þjóðverja og Sovétmanna inn í Pólland haustið 1939. Forczyk byggir mikið á pólskum heimildum og áhugavert er að sjá hvernig pólski herinn stóð oft vel í hárinu á þýska hernum og víða gerðu stjórnendur beggja herja afdrífarík mistök sem reyndust Pólverjum þó öllu verr því þeir máttu ekki við slíku. Pólverjar voru í óða önn að endurbæta tæknibúnað herafla síns og voru framarlega á ýmsum sviðum en langt á eftir Þjóðverjum á vissum sviðum s.s. samskiptabúnaði herdeilda. Þjóðverjar voru rétt að byrja að þróa leiftursóknina, hernaðaraðferð sem gjörbylti hernaði á fyrri hluta seinni heimsstyrjaldar. Oft lentu þeir í miklum vandræðum vegna þess að herbúnaðurinn hentaði ekki og hernaðartæknin var oft á tíðum vanþróuð.
Þeir lærðu hins vegar af mistökum sínum, nýttu sér reynsluna frá Póllandi til hins ítrasta í innrásinni í Frakkland og unnu sína glæstustu sigra 1941 þegar þeir réðust inn í Sovétríkin áður en andstæðingar þeirra þróuðu tækni og varnir sem stóðust hervél Þjóðverja fyllilega snúning. ( )

This is a superb book by LTC Forczyk that covers historical ground overlooked by most previous historians of the Second World War and the Polish Capaign of 1939 in particular. While some readers may call this volume revisionist as it differs significantly from those previous histories, I do not. A history that uses all pertinent sources, old and new, as a basis for a correct history is never a revisionist one. Most previous histories did not access the sources that Forczyk utilized, thus telling only part of the story that was there to tell.

The author includes in his 350 pages (according to my Kindle edition) an introduction, eight numbered chapters, an epilogue, a key to map symbols, a table of officer ranks in the three national armies detailed in this book along with their British and American equivalents (Forczyk gives all ranks in the native language of its national army), a list of abbreviations, an Appendix A with the campaign orders of battle for both Poland and Germany, an Appendix B with the campaign order of battle for the Red Army, an Appendix C with a chronology, an Appendix D with a list of the organizations and strengths of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS mechanized units, a section of notes, a bibliography, a short author's biography, and a selection of photographs.

The book is divided roughly in half, with Chapters One through Four setting the stage for the Polish/German/Soviet conflict, Chapters Five, Six, and Seven detailing the month-long campaign, and Chapter Eight speaking to both Poland's wartime German and postwar Soviet occcupation. New to me details that I found in my reading was the extent of covert German operations in both Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939. The so-called "fifth columnists" of legend really were German special operators. The author's evaluation of the armies of this campaign were equally enlightening. The Poles performed creditably but would have lost anyway, given the gross inequities between the armies. However, the Poles could have performed even better had it not been for incredibly poor decisions by senior Polish Army leadership. The Germans, for their part, were nowhere near as invincible as Nazi propagandists and many postwar historians would have readers believe. There were significant staff shortcomings during the campaign that the Polish Army could not take advantage of, but that later German opponents could and did. There were also major equipment failures in that the vast majority of German armor was too poorly protected even against under-equipped forces such as the Poles. German logistics fared badly as well, and this is the one warfare area that the Germans would continue to neglect throughout the war. The Red Army did what it needed to do Stalin's bidding; its weaknesses would become apparent in a few months during the Winter War in Finland. Most postwar histories gloss over both the accomplishments of the Polish Army and the German problems, but Forczyk lays bare all of these points.

Overall this is a great title to have in your library. Forczyk mentions only one other book that examines the Polish Campaign in an unbiased fashion--Steve Zaloga and Victor Madej's "The Polish Campaign 1939", published in 1985. Zaloga, now known widely as a defense analyst and armor historian, and Madej focus unblinking eyes on the organization, doctrine, and equipment, while give a fairly brief account of the campaign. Mention of Soviet operations during the campaign is limited as the Polish sources available to Zaloga and Madej minimized their criticism of Moscow during the Soviet era. Forczyk's account, with broader access to now more complete Polish sources, is more balanced in covering all three armies involved with the 1939 campaign. I'd still keep that Zaloga/Madej volume, though, for its superior coverage of the Polish Army of 1939. ( )

If I were to simply regard this book from the perspective of straight military history I would rank it somewhat higher, as this is the best operational account of Germany's invasion of 1939 I've ever seen. Forczyk's perspective regarding most of the participants is unsparing, and he is often as critical of Polish actors as he is of the Germans or Soviets. However, particular disdain is reserved for Chamberlain's government in Britain; let's just say that when Forczyk uses the word "appeasement" you can hear the sibilant hiss of contempt. As for what would have really made a difference Forczyk tends to focus on Anglo-American willingness to provide resources to the Soviet state in the name of business and the Anglo-French unwillingness to truly punish the Nazi Regime for it's flagrant disregard of Versailles, which allowed Berlin and Moscow to accelerate their military preparations; though this seems to be a rather unrealistic perspective considering the political chaos of the post-1929 era. Still, Forczyk essentially does admit that the Polish Second Republic was often its own worst enemy, what with grandiose dreams of territorial expansion and a military high command warped by internal political conflict. Poland deserved better, but that's usually besides the point in international conflict. ( )

Forczyk is establishing himself as one of the best military analysts accessible to the lay reader today. I loved Case Red: The Fall of France, and this is possibly even better. He writes with passion as he demolishes the myths surround Germany's blitzkrieg of the hapless Poles. First and foremost, that it was a walkover for the Nazis, it was not, the Poles fought ferociously, quite possibly harder that France did. They also fought honorably despite the circumstances, scrupulously honouring the Geneva Convention with regard to POWs, while the Germans freely and contempuously executed Polish prisoners and civilians at whim. Secondly, that Poland's air force was destroyed on the ground on the first day, in fact they remained a constant threat to the Germans until the last days of the campaign, despite flying obsolete aircraft, the Polish pilots were skillful and brave and downed more than 100 Nazi aircraft. Not all the Poles equipment was outdated, their 7TP tanks were superior to the Panzer I & II but there were too few and they were wasted fighting in small packets. In short, although Poland had the 4th largest army in Europe, they were brought down by poor planning, political shenanigans, Poland's straitened financial circumstances that prevented buying modern equipment, and an inability to decide where to put their armies to best defend the nation. Despite the bravery of the Polish military, they were caught short on September 1 and were never given the chance to reorganize their forces in a way that could stop the Germans. The Germans themselves had problems, Hitler's much vaunted war machine was still in its teething stages, despite the myth of mechanization, much of their force was horse-drawn, and supply was a constant issue. However Forcyzk makes the point that the Germans were quick to learn and that their experience in Poland was instrumental in developing the improved Blitzkrieg that tore through France and the Low Countries in May 1940. He reserves his most scornful criticism for Poland's supposed Allies, Britain and France, who cynically promised to support Poland and in the end calculatedly did nothing, the machinations of the Chamberlain government in particular certainly does not make pretty reading. Also lashed with contempt is Stalin's Soviet Union, which made a deal with the devil then sat back until Poland was prostrate before slicing their own section of the corpse away. A grim note is provided by Forcyzk's footnote on every page when he mentions a senior Polish officer who was subsequently executed by the Soviets in Katyn Wood, a foul crime for which no-one was ever brought to justice that the Soviet regime denied until glasnost but that Putin government has done back to denying. This is both a tragic and inspiring and book, for as horrific the suffering of the Poles was, they remained resistant and defiant (Forcyzk notes that unlike France and other occupied countries, there was virtually no collaboration by the Poles). Poles fought bravely in the RAF and as soldiers on the ground in North Africa, Italy and many other campaigns. Tragically, the machinations of the West left them after the war still enslaved by the Soviet Union and fighting until finally winning their freedom in the 1990s, possibly the longest resistance campaign in history. A wonderful book, which provides a minute but fascinating story of a heartbreaking episode in European history, while at the same time celebrates a brave people who refused to give up ever. Superb reading. ( )