n spite of Socrates' claim(s) that he never taught anyone, this book supposes that he did. According to Scott, if we pay attention to the dramatic elements of Plato's dialogues, rather than focusing on the argumentative failures (aporia), we can uncover both Socrates' core beliefs, as well as see the strategies he uses to effect a positive change in his interlocutors.

Scott grants that as an educator Plato's Socrates is presented as rather unsuccessful. Indeed, he finds only 3 examples where Socrates has any measure of success with his dialogic partners. Interestingly they are all dialogues with young boys: Lysis, Alcibiades I and Charmides. Scott argues that in each of these dialogues Socrates deploys a similar erotic strategy (he does not call it a method) to "seduce" the interlocutor into the practice of philosophy, which Scott will primarily speak of in terms of self-care, or "taking trouble over oneself."

The erotic strategy goes like this, in three steps: First, Socrates effects a leveling of previously held beliefs. In the case of all three dialogues mentioned, Socrates undermines each interlocutor's understanding of their own sense of freedom and self-sufficiency. Second, Socrates, kindles passion in his interlocutors via an "erotic" arousal. In each of the three dialogues, Socrates identifies his partners' latent desires as a desire for total license (unreflective freedom). Once he has shown them they are not free (via #1), he proceeds to envision a world in which they could exercise the total freedom they have in mind. Scott argues that what Socrates is arousing is their appetite for power/domination/acquisitiveness. This arousal (#2) is always truncated before the moment of climax and is replaced instead by stage 3: Socrates chastens them for their hubris, demonstrating that they are not free, that they suppose to know things they do not. This chastening is a sort of productive shaming that--in these three semi-successful dialogues--allows the interlocutor to reflect back on themselves, and to accept their dependence on Socrates and his guidance.

Gary Scott's book is economical and incisive. His primary argument is that we can develop an account of Socrates' understanding of freedom in the penumbras of the texts. He brings into view the significance of Socrates' independence or non-participation in the market economy. His conversations operate more in the realm of the gift economy, except most people didn't recognize his talks as the "gifts" they were. (In the Apology Socrates declares himself a gift to the Athens.) Scott doesn't excavate an individualist account of freedom from Socrates: instead freedom is an understanding of one's own limitations, and it is the freedom to take "trouble over oneself", to practice daily habits of caring for oneself so that one's words and deeds conform with one another (consistency in thought and action). It turns out that taking trouble over oneself happens through dialogue, so when Socrates speaks with others and exhorts them to exercise self-care, he is at the same time demonstrating to them what that self-care looks like by practicing right in front of them.

In this way, even in dialogues with vast unequals, such as the Lysis, Alcibiades I and Charmides, Socrates gains something in the encounter. He is not merely benefiting those with whom he speaks, because by speaking with him these children allow Socrates to exercise his freedom, and thus the highest and best part of himself. ( )