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The Practice of Moral Judgment de Barbara…
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The Practice of Moral Judgment (edició 1993)

de Barbara Herman (Autor)

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531373,406 (4)No n'hi ha cap
Barbara Herman argues for a radical shift in the way we perceive Kant's ethics. She convincingly reinterprets the key texts, at once allowing Kant to mean what he says while showing that what Kant says makes good moral sense. She urges us to abandon the tradition that describes Kantian ethics as a deontology, a moral system of rules of duty. She finds the central idea of Kantian ethics not in duty but in practical rationality as a norm of unconditioned goodness. This book both clarifies Kant's own theory and adds programmatic vitality to modern moral philosophy.… (més)
Membre:drbrand
Títol:The Practice of Moral Judgment
Autors:Barbara Herman (Autor)
Informació:Harvard University Press (1993), Edition: First Edition, 268 pages
Col·leccions:La teva biblioteca
Valoració:*****
Etiquetes:philosophy

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The Practice of Moral Judgment de Barbara Herman

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According to this deliberative-field model, the practical self does not have as its major task negotiating a settlement among independent competing claims. Insofar as one has interests and commitments, one is a human self. But a human life is not the result of a "bundle" of competing interests (among which is an interest in morality). One's interests are present on a deliberative field that contains everything that gives one reasons. Thus, in addition to interests and attachments, there are also grounds of obligation, principles of prudential rationality, and, depending on the individual, a more or less complex conception of the Good. Not everything that may seek a place on my deliberative field is good for me to have there: bad habits, destructive relationships, incompatible goals and projects. And if there is a real question about what enters (or remains on) the deliberative field—this is often a question about ends—the conditions for accepting desires or interests as ends may (and often will) shape the result.

The Practice of Moral Judgment is the most compelling interpretation of Kant that I've read so far. Whether it is faithful to Kant is somewhat hard to say. I'm inclined to read him in the way Herman does, but Kant does himself no favors in many of his looser moments. As such, one could say that Herman is reading Kant with rose-colored glasses. But this is not a criticism—if Kant didn't mean what Herman took him to be saying, I think it's the way he should have meant it. ( )
  drbrand | Jan 13, 2021 |
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Barbara Herman argues for a radical shift in the way we perceive Kant's ethics. She convincingly reinterprets the key texts, at once allowing Kant to mean what he says while showing that what Kant says makes good moral sense. She urges us to abandon the tradition that describes Kantian ethics as a deontology, a moral system of rules of duty. She finds the central idea of Kantian ethics not in duty but in practical rationality as a norm of unconditioned goodness. This book both clarifies Kant's own theory and adds programmatic vitality to modern moral philosophy.

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