Aquest lloc utilitza galetes per a oferir els nostres serveis, millorar el desenvolupament, per a anàlisis i (si no has iniciat la sessió) per a publicitat. Utilitzant LibraryThing acceptes que has llegit i entès els nostres Termes de servei i política de privacitat. L'ús que facis del lloc i dels seus serveis està subjecte a aquestes polítiques i termes.
While quick to question the claims to knowledge that others make, philosophers have not so readily submitted their own affirmations to the same scrutiny. In fact, it seems to be the common conviction of philosophers that the assertions they make are cognitive, are true or false, and that philosophical disagreement is genuine disagreement. In this stimulating essay Professor Lange confronts this assumption, presents his own view of philosophy as proposal, and then seeks a solution to the paradox that his view poses for philosophy. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.… (més)
Informació del coneixement compartit en anglès.Modifica-la per localitzar-la a la teva llengua.
I have read the following little book with great interest, having written it.
Citacions
Informació del coneixement compartit en anglès.Modifica-la per localitzar-la a la teva llengua.
Do we as philosophers not have a right to be embarrassed when we glance up into the stands, and notice the rest of the intellectual community gazing down at us in puzzlement, if not derision? They see us as costumed gladiators (some in white coats, some in smoking jackets, etc.) each defending his square yard of bloody sand against all comers. Is it any wonder if they ask themselves, "Are they trying to state truths, or are they just trying to kill each other?" And sometimes do we not, in a bothersome, twinging moment, probably at a philosophy convention, ask outselves the same question?
And it seems obvious, at least prima facie, that not just any proposal counts as an acceptable answer to a philosophical question, e.g., there are few philosophical questions to which "Let's shut the door" would be an acceptable answer, though perhaps an analogous proposal, "Let's forget about it," has been in fact tacitly and perhaps judiciously proposed as an answer to many philosophical questions, including the one about what is a philosophical question; forgetting about it may not be a good way to resolve practical problems, like securing enough drinking water, but it works pretty well with philosophical problems, one characteristic of which seems to be that they may be neglected with equanimity; it is not always easy to forget a philosophical problem, but it is always safe to do so; there is more than one way to stop an itch, and forgetting about it works as well as any.
First-order philosophy is philosophy as proposal.Second-order philosophy is philosophy which presupposes that the first-order questions are settled and proceeds on that basis.
Darreres paraules
Nota de desambiguació
Informació del coneixement compartit en anglès.Modifica-la per localitzar-la a la teva llengua.
Although John Lange is one of Michael Crichton's pen names, this philosophy text is not in any of his bibliographies: it was written by John Frederick Lange, Jr.
Editor de l'editorial
Creadors de notes promocionals a la coberta
Llengua original
CDD/SMD canònics
LCC canònic
▾Referències
Referències a aquesta obra en fonts externes.
Wikipedia en anglès
Cap
▾Descripcions del llibre
While quick to question the claims to knowledge that others make, philosophers have not so readily submitted their own affirmations to the same scrutiny. In fact, it seems to be the common conviction of philosophers that the assertions they make are cognitive, are true or false, and that philosophical disagreement is genuine disagreement. In this stimulating essay Professor Lange confronts this assumption, presents his own view of philosophy as proposal, and then seeks a solution to the paradox that his view poses for philosophy. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.