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S'està carregant… L'Estructura de les revolucions científiques (1962)de Thomas S. Kuhn
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» 17 més No hi ha cap discussió a Converses sobre aquesta obra. After buying a used copy, I found this more up-to-date version on Hoopla, and I recommend it instead of an older version. As a non-scientist, I kept hearing about this book in various places, notably in several Teaching Company Great Courses on physics. So I picked it up. It isn't a difficult read, although Kuhn's language could be clearer here and there, and he has a liking for a few odd words that he repeats over and over--which is, of course, much better than just using them once. His argument, that science progresses through a series of revolutions that replace old paradigms with new ones, seems pretty self-evident to me, but apparently wasn't (and maybe isn't) to scientists themselves. The book can be dry at times, but Kuhn provides examples to demonstrate his point, so a reader like me can learn a good bit about the history of science, which I always find fascinating. I would not call this an essential book for anyone who enjoys watching science courses, however. I suggest you read the 50th anniversary edition instead of this earlier one (Third Edition). (No rating) A convincing and readable account of how science works in practice, challenging the previously dominant view of the gradual, consistent, stepwise accumulation of knowledge. Throughout Kuhn uses examples of famous scientific breakthroughs to illustrate and justify his main points – many of these quite interesting in their own right, and spanning between electricity, chemistry, atoms, light, gravity, genetics and more. Not directly incompatible with either the earlier work of Popper, or the later work of Feyerabend, Kuhn proposes that Science alternates through two phases – the relatively stable “normal science” phase of problem solving and tying up loose ends within a paradigm (measuring stuff to validate theoretical predictions etc.), and the “crisis” phase where the paradigm (or worldview) has to be replaced due to an accumulating body of phenomena that don’t fit in with the predictions of the current theoretical framework. During the latter, competing schools obtain evidence to support alternative candidate worldviews (theories), with the one producing the best evidence, and most explanatory theory winning out after a period of chaos. Then a period of normal science ensues, then another revolution. Whether this goes on forever, or whether we eventually reach a fully satisfactory explanation of all observed phenomena is not discussed at length. A revolution and paradigm shift in one field, for example understanding of electricity, might or might not particularly affect science in another field, with some minor revolutions being quite self-contained within a specialism, and others affecting many other adjacent disciplines. What sets out a revolution, or paradigm shift, from a development in normal science, is the entire change in underlying theoretical framework (or paradigm) relating to a set of phenomena. So, the transition from gravity being explained by Newtonian equations to Einsteinian equations (relativity) would count, whereas the application of Einstein’s equations to predict the existence of black holes, or that the universe began as a singularity (with or without any evidence to support these predictions), would not count as a paradigm shift, as these are entirely compatible with the existing framework of Relativity. Unfortunately the term “Paradigm shift” has entered common usage with little care for what it actually means. Kuhn also discusses the consequences of revolutions and presents his ideas on incommensurability – how words and scientific concepts no longer mean the same things after a paradigm shift, how we see the world in a different way. How the meaning of the old terms cannot be directly translated into something that can be fully understood within the framework of the new worldview. This has certain consequences, especially during the time of transition when scientists operating within competing frameworks struggle to find a common language, and end up talking at cross purposes. A classic deserving to be on the reading list for anyone interested in the philosophy or history of science, or science in general. More than a 3 but less than a 4. Little of this is particularly surprising, except of course to someone who things scientists are robots instead of messy, frequently irrational, and deeply socially concerned normal people. To them it's dangerous heresy of course. And all that's fine -- it's an important book and the topic should be addressed, at least if we care about advancing our understanding of science and its advancement (and people in general really). The righting style is were it comes up short. Pretty dry and pedantic. It's not so bad that I wouldn't recommend it, but it does make it somewhat tough-going in places.
The lasting value of Kuhn’s thesis in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that it reminds us that any science, however apparently purified of the taint of philosophical speculation, is nevertheless embedded in a philosophical framework — and that the great success of physics and biology is due not to their actual independence from philosophy but rather to physicists’ and biologists’ dismissal of it. Those who are inclined to take this dismissal as meaning that philosophy is dead altogether, or has been replaced by science, will do well to recognize the force by which Kuhn’s thesis opposes this stance: History has repeatedly demonstrated that periods of progress in normal science — when philosophy seems to be moot — may be long and steady, but they lead to a time when non-scientific, philosophical questions again become paramount. ... Kuhn deserves the respect of the rigorous criticism that has come his way. It is fitting that his provocative thesis has faced blistering scrutiny — and remarkable that it has survived to instruct and vex us five decades later. Pertany a aquestes col·leccions editorialsCiència i acció (1) Filozofické odkazy (Pravda). Rad B: Súčasná nemarxistická filozofia (1982, 2504. publikácia) — 2 més Abreujat aTé una guia de referència/complementLlistes notables
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The theses of this work are fairly well know, to those who would come looking for it, so I will not get into that. Rather I will say that this is a book that deserves a re-reading or two (or three) for the nuance that runs all throughout it. I will certainly be coming back to it in a few months or a year. (