Perhaps *the* place to start if all you know about Hegel is that he's a metaphysical lunatic who thinks 'The Absolute' develops over time and individuals don't exist. Pinkard effectively destroys this silly reading, and provides an interesting one in its place: that Hegel is basically talking about the accounts we give of things and ourselves, and showing how they change over time. This leaves out a great deal though, reducing Hegel to a bit too much of a pragmatist. Pippin's work (e.g., 'Hegel's Idealism') is a good corrective, since it involves much more the transcendental question of how we come to know objects, or what an object is for us.

The best thing about this book, though, is that it makes the Phenomenology - one of the least coherent books of all time - coherent. Pinkard treats the opening chapters as they obviously ought to be treated, an investigation into the minimal conditions for an account of how things are (to put it in unhelpfully abstract terms). He argues that these minimal conditions include consciousness, and that the second section of the PhS is an investigation into the minimal conditions for an account of consciousness - which turns out to include self-consciousness, so that the next section is an investigation into *its* minimal conditions. The last, historical portion of the PhS is an account of how we came to this point. That all this makes sense is remarkable; not sure if it's right though. I suspect it just is incoherent.

One thing to note: I've read the PhS, and re-read most of it many times. It's not clear to me if this is helpful as an introduction to the reading of the PhS, but I'm certain it would be helpful to read alongside Hegel's work. And the introduction is excellent if you're looking for a short intro. ( )