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Nenhum livro de economia publicado nos últimos anos foi capaz de provocar o furor internacional causado por O capital no século XXI , do francês Thomas Piketty.

Seu estudo sobre a concentração de riqueza e a evolução da desigualdade ganhou manchetes nos principais jornais do mundo, gerou discussões nas redes sociais e colheu comentários e elogios de diversos ganhadores do Prêmio Nobel.

Fruto de quinze anos de pesquisas incansáveis, o livro se apoia em dados que remontam ao século XVIII, provenientes de mais de vinte países, para chegar a conclusões explosivas. O crescimento econômico e a difusão do conhecimento impediram que fosse concretizado o cenário apocalíptico previsto por Karl Marx no século XIX. Porém, os registros históricos demonstram que o capitalismo tende a criar um círculo vicioso de desigualdade, pois, no longo prazo, a taxa de retorno sobre os ativos é maior que o ritmo do crescimento econômico, o que se traduz numa concentração cada vez maior da riqueza. Uma situação de desigualdade extrema pode levar a um descontentamento geral e até ameaçar os valores democráticos. Mas Piketty lembra também que a intervenção política já foi capaz de reverter tal quadro no passado e poderá voltar a fazê-lo.

Essa obra, que já se tornou uma referência entre os estudos econômicos, contribui para renovar inteiramente nossa compreensão sobre a dinâmica do capitalismo ao colocar sua contradição fundamental na relação entre o crescimento econômico e o rendimento do capital. O capital no século XXI nos obriga a refletir profundamente sobre as questões mais prementes de nosso tempo.

“Piketty transformou nosso discurso econômico; jamais voltaremos a falar sobre renda e desigualdade da maneira que fazíamos.” - Paul Krugman (Prêmio Nobel de Economia), The New York Times

“Um livro seminal sobre a evolução econômico-social do planeta... Uma obra-prima.” - Emmanuel Todd, Marianne
 
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luizzmendes | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Mar 16, 2024 |
You aren't going to believe me when I tell you that the long version of Piketty's argument, which is spread over many thousands of pages of dense text, is easier to read and understand than this summary version. Unless, perhaps, you are a Talmudic or Bibilcal scholar, or proceed like those people who read "Finnegans Wake" a page at a time.

Piketty's distillation is only 274 pages but each sentence condenses a chapter or more of his long-form works. Without the longer explanations, it is too dense to understand without reference books and search engines. I have read a few of Piketty's other books and liked them better.
 
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Dokfintong | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Feb 18, 2024 |
First book I have read in a while that makes me feel I am really learning what is going on around me. I finished this book just a few days before my wife, my daughter and I embarked on a whirlwind tour of six countries in Western Europe. I had a fresh look at cities I'd visited before and thought about things in light of what Thomas Piketty had to say about the super rich, the growing disparity between the upper decile and everybody else, and the unlikelihood that things will change for the better anytime soon.

When you travel you inevitably eat out and when you eat out these days in the cities of London, Amsterdam, Paris, and even smaller centres like Interlaken, Switzerland, the first thing you discover is that your waiters, your busboys, and most of your food preparers come from somewhere other than where you are dining. And virtually all of these people commute to work. From my unscientific poll I learned that commute time vary anywhere from one to one and a half hours each way, each day.

Even professionals. One woman dining at the table next to us at a restaurant facing the Thames said her daily commute as a financial advisor consumed a good portion of her salary, and that if she missed her regular train to the Midlands could cost her 100 pounds sterling just to get home before her children got to bed. I translated that to Canadian dollars and that mounts to $202.65....for a one way ticket home!

For the people who earn a basic wage working in these restaurants it means sharing accomodation, taking costly transit to and from work, a eating what you can get. It means little if any money at the end of the day to save. Little if any money at the end of the day to send home. And few choices. The young Poles, the Lithuanians, the Slovaks, the Albanians I spoke to all seemed to have one objective: to get back to where they came from as soon as conditions improved in their homelands.

In Toronto, where thousands of migrant Phillipines work as nannies, caregivers for the aged, and in other low wage jobs, at least these people seem to be able to send home funds to support their distant families.

This is what capital provides in this day and age.

What it doesn't provide is any greater access to political or financial reform...because the individuals most affected by capital have no voice of dissent. Where they live they don't vote, and where they vote they don't live, and even if they did live where they vote...in Greece maybe?...the vote carries little value in the big scheme of things.
 
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MylesKesten | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Jan 23, 2024 |
While I cannot pretend to have understood most of this book, I can say this based on my own experience as a reader and a graduate student: it is a first rate piece of evidence-driven--exhaustively evidence-driven, including an extensive online scholarly technical apparatus--historical inquiry.
 
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Mark_Feltskog | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Dec 23, 2023 |
Un análisis certero de las causas de las desigualdades y una propuesta cabal para abordar el problema.

Síntesis de sus investigaciones sobre las desigualdades económicas, este certero texto de Thomas Piketty analiza cuestiones como la educación, la herencia, la fiscalidad y la persistente brecha de género, a la vez que subraya la necesidad de reducir drásticamente los desequilibrios Norte-Sur como condición para luchar contra el calentamiento global.

Frente a la desesperanza y el conformismo, el autor nos recuerda que el camino hacia la igualdad se ha construido siempre sobre las luchas políticas y sociales.
 
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bibliotecayamaguchi | Hi ha 1 ressenya més | Dec 21, 2023 |
Piketty provides a long historical view of economic information to support his thesis about growing wealth inequality. Sustained disparities between economic growth and return on investments will quickly result in large and unevenly distributed private wealth. Data from the 18th to the 21st centuries reveal the 20th century, with its global wars and depressions, as the anomaly rather than the norm, and now inequality is accumulating as much as in the 19th century, with no real upper limit. Great wealth disparity is ultimately incompatible with democracy, so if the latter is of value -- and Piketty clearly believes it is -- the former should be tempered. Piketty's suggested way to do that is by means of a progressive wealth tax.

I really appreciate Piketty's use of historical documents; he doesn't draw artificial distinctions between history, economics, politics and sociology. His (and Arthur Goldhammer's translation) is clear and easy to follow. Insightful.
 
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questbird | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Dec 10, 2023 |
Excellent book. Well-document history of equality in the world (mostly western). When looked at through charts and data one can see the efforts for and against equality and while we seem to be in a period of decline, it is useful to see when we were in periods of increases to equality so that we can get back on that track. Excellent book. Interesting theory (I think I came to through this book?) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expenditure_cascades
 
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BookyMaven | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Dec 6, 2023 |
Boken er et svar til de som skremmes av mursteiner der Piketty så langt har gitt ut 2 av dem; "Kapitalen i det 21.årh." (2013) og "Kapital og ideologi" (2019). Her i denne boken har han fokus på ulikheter og likheter der disse siste ser ut til å ha økt. Han problematiserer det forenklede begrepet BNP og trekker inn livsstandarder og levestandarder, tilgang til utdanning, tilgang til helsetjenester og polemiserer bl a mot Gini-koeffesienten som iflg ham blir for enkel og grov når det gjelder å beskrive utviklingstrekk og tilstander. Historien forteller om ulikheter og kreftene som opprettholder disse, men den forteller også om de siste hundre års innsats for å endre på dette. 1900-tallet brakte både den russiske revolusjon, to verdenskriger og krisen i 1929 pluss frigjøringskamper for å bli kvitt kolonistyrer. Alle disse hendelsene rammet både verdensøkonomien og menneskenes velferd. Utallige kamper ble utkjempet politisk for å opprettholde sivilisasjoner - fagforeninger og folkebevegelser i tillegg til radikale politiske ideer var helt sentrale her. Progressive skatter ble innført, formuer ble avkortet og gjeld ble slettet - store grep i reguleringens ånd som hindret samfunns sammenbrudd.
 
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lestrond | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Sep 29, 2023 |
"En forrygende gennomgang af historien" skiver den danske avisen Information om boken. Likeledes er den en glimrende oversikt innen faget politisk økonomi og sammenliknende politikk med skildringer over de endringer som har skjedd globalt ila et par hundre år både i Asia, Europa, Midt-Østen, Afrika og Nord- og Sør-Amerika. Som mange har etterlyst, fyller den også etterlengtet viten i faget økonomisk historie.

Innledningen har med en delvis oppsummering fra Kapitalen i det 21.årh.

Kap.1 starter med analyse av det 3-delte samfunn; geistligheten, adelen og den arbeidende klasse. Kapitlene om tre-delingen, kirkens rolle og maktens stiilferdige knusing av Den franske revolusjon, er god opptenning. At ting som skjer samtidig og forkludrer planer og ideer og at andre løsninger presser seg fram, er veldig tilforlatelig presentert og analysert. Den franske revolusjon bidro til - i motsetning til hva vi er blitt fortalt - å forsterke og sementere ulikheter. Dette kommer frem fra statens egne arkiver som revolusjonen bl a førte til - et system av nitid registrering. Så foretas en komparativ analyse av Frankrike mot Storbrittania der bl a Henrik 8s fight med paven pga av Hs skilsmisser og ekteskap gav Henrik stimulans til å redusere pavens makt. Dette gjorde han ved å selge klostrene og slik redusere de geistliges makt og innflytelse. Da fikk de andre elitene mer makt der, særlig adelen og siden godseierne.

Det går tydelig fram av de historiske skildringene fra utviklingen i de ulike stormaktene at fordeling av rettigheter som f.eks. stemmegiving har vært uløselig knyttet til eiendom, jord og formue. De eiendomsløse (leilendinger og slaver) var uten sivile rettigheter og i noen tilfelle bare gjenstander. Lesekyndighet var i mange tilfelle ett av siviliseringskravene i samfunn der utdanning bare var forbeholdt de priviligerte - både formelt og de facto. Formell og allmenn stemmerett var i de seneste landene ikke etablert før langt opp i det 20.årh. (f.eks. akkurat her: Brasil).
Å unngå å gå via kolonialisering og slaveri, gjør det mulig å forstå den tunge ulikhetsarven som fortsatt preger den globale verden (s.231).

Inn med mellomstoff

Skildring av ulikhetene i utdanningssystemet - både i koloniene og i de såkalte moderlandene - viser at de er ekstreme, dvs hvilket skille det er i økonomisk tildeling til skoleslag for de ulike samfunnslagene (s.253 flg.).

Inn med mellomstoff

Senere (s.462 flg.) presenteres USAs økonomiske forsprang sammen med deres tidlige satsing på både grunnutdanning og videregående utdanning - dette sammen med utvidelse av stemmerettigheter for menn.

Besøket i særlig Inda med koloniseringseffektene og beskrivelsen av skillet og sammenheng mellom kaster og jatierer er lærestykker. Brasil som et av verdens mest ulike land med innførsel av allmenn stemmerett først i 1980, forklarer mye om Sør-Amerikas største land med stor politisk uro.

Identitetspolitikk og oppfatning av grenser er stikkord som trer i stedet for fordeling og rettferdighet. Piketty kaller dette "de komplekse interaktioner mellem de socioøkonomiske og proprietistiske konflikter og de etnisk-religiøse og identitetspolitiske skillelinjer"(s.820). Slik dreier ideologiene fokus til å være obs på såkalte forskjeller istf likheter. De glemte felt er økonomisk og beslutningsmessig transparens, skatte- og fordelingspolitikk, utdanningspolitkk og helse- og sosialpolitikk.
 
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lestrond | Hi ha 4 ressenyes més | Sep 9, 2023 |
if you want a detailed understanding of income inequality from an esteemed economist, this is for you.
 
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pollycallahan | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Jul 1, 2023 |
Yet another cinder-block of a book from or after Piketty (the third in my collection in fact), which I approach with trepidation. Two weeks in, I realized that the only way of approaching such a tome, which will have a fair chance of success, is to treat it as consisting of four (or more) distinct books: fortunately the author has been kind enough to mark out the parts, and in fact has given the reader the permission to read each separately. After two months' slogging on and off, I finished what is marked off as Part Two: on the slave and colonial economies, with a long chapter on India which was of great interest to me (from the subcontinent). This part is not just economics, but also a survey of history. Finally, sweet feeling of triumph: I have finished the whole book! Part Three deals with the 'Great Transformation" from social-democrat to a general capitalist-globalist ruling system in the twentyfirst century, while Part Four makes an in-depth analysis of the whole subject. The author uses a novel approach to track the changing allegiance of the people in different countries or regions over time: he uses the results of post-election opinion surveys, which record people's views and their self-declared social or income status. He correlates these with records of personal and inheritance taxes wherever available.
This is an encyclopedic work, and one cannot summarise it or do justice in a paragraph here. However, on of the most interesting for me, as a reader from the sub-continent, is his lengthy discussion of the caste-based system in medieval times, and the comparison (contrast) of current trends of allegiance of upper and lower (in terms of income/social status) segments of the Indian population. He says that in the West, after around 2008, gradually the more educated tended to support the social-democrat parties, while the lower half veered to the rightist parties, having apparently lost faith in the intentions or the competence of the left parties that they had traditionally supported; in India, in contrast, the 'forward' and better educated sections seem to have veered to the right (the BJP phenomenon).
An absorbing work, but one wonders why the author has filled so many pages: because there is so much information along the way, sometimes it is difficult to follow any thread. It would have been better to have left out some of the old history, and just discuss the contemporary situation. The author himself is well aware of this complaint, and in fact has responded by bringing out a slimmer, summary volume, which I will look into sometime to see which approach (put in everything versus stick to a tight sub-plot) is more effective½
 
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Dilip-Kumar | Hi ha 4 ressenyes més | Jun 1, 2023 |
This book is required reading for anyone interested in the underlying structure of monetary policy. Piketty was unabashedly conservative, favoring tax structures that inhibit the natural tendency of capital to breed more capital thus concentrating wealth. Even if your economic ideals are different, this book's hard look at historical records is instructive.
 
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Dokfintong | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Mar 30, 2023 |
Surprisingly easy read. Tax the rich!
 
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squealermusic | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Mar 16, 2023 |
Ein absolutes Muss für jeden der sich über die Wirtschaft unserer Zeit Gedanken macht. Das Buch ist durch die vielen Zahlen etwas zäh zu lesen.
 
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mthorner | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Jan 12, 2023 |
The foremost theorist regarding economic inequality explores history to understand how we got here and the best way forward.

His main historical thesis considers a fourfold movement: the "trifunctional" society, which he explains in terms of pre-Revolution French estates of the monarchy/military, the clergy, and the rest of the people, with the first two rationalizing their expropriation of the resources of the third; the shift, in various ways, to a "proprietarian" society in the wake of the collapse of "trifunctional" societies, in which property rights were held most sacred; then a kind of "post-proprietarian" social democratic age from 1918 to 1980 in which societies maintained progressive taxation and sharply reduced inequality; and "neo-proprietarianism" which has reversed many of the gains in equality since the 1980s.

The author explores how this went down in societies around the world and how matters of inequality plays out in various places and domains, regarding educational opportunity, healthcare, employment and benefits, etc. The second half of the work looks in greater detail at how societies could choose to reduce inequality through participatory socialism but also looks at the prospect of more crudely nationalist or fascist possibilities.

The author's historical analysis is on point and extremely important. The Left in general should reckon with his assessment of the collapse of their strengths in the 1980s and afterward and return to a more robust progressive taxation scheme to reduce intergenerational inequality. Socialism writ large should grapple with their obsession with the means of production.

But his way forward, as "optimal" as it might be, is very French, if not at least Continental European. Without some major crises which none of us really want to experience it has no chance of being realized in the USA. It is as if the author wanted to trigger every "freedom" impulse in every red-blooded American.

Definitely worth consideration for its historical analysis and even as an exercise in imagination for the future.
 
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deusvitae | Hi ha 4 ressenyes més | Dec 8, 2022 |
The French theorist regarding inequality shifts focus to discuss how societies became more equal and charts out ways societies could increase equality.

Most of the material in this work can be found in the author's more exhaustive history of inequality. Many of the examples are the same as well as the policy recommendations.

The author has a lot of good ideas. It would be great for socialism to get away from obsession over the means of production and to instead focus on progressive taxation and work to de-capitalize certain domains. He's right that a more enlightened socialism maintained around the world would be best. And the author has clearly not spent enough time around Americans to understand how pretty much everything he thinks should be done cuts against the grain of the American ethos.

Just go read the more expansive history of inequality.
 
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deusvitae | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Dec 8, 2022 |
Invoering van progressieve belastingstelsels, sterk verbeterd onderwijs en de invoering van de verzorgingsstaat hebben geleid tot verbetering in verdeling van inkomen en vermogen. We weten dus dat genoemde maatregelen effectief kunnen zijn in de bestrijding van te grote verschillen in inkomen en vermogen en verbetering van levensomstandigheden van iedereen.
Daarover gaat dit boek.

Het is in het verlengde van zijn eerdere (beroemde) publicaties een soort tour d’horizon van de huidige problematiek met daarbij de verwijzingen naar de recente economische ontwikkelingen. Ook dekolonisatie speelt in deze ontwikkelingen een belangrijke rol. Het boek is uitstekend van opbouw maar wordt naar het einde toe soms toch wat vaag en “wollig”, met name wanneer het gaat over mogelijke oplossingen en noodzakelijke geachte stelselwijzigingen.

Per saldo een lezenswaardig boek.
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deklerk | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Nov 17, 2022 |
You don't have to agree with all of Piketty's ultimate conclusions and recommendations (and I am still processing them) to be blown away by the breadth of research and clarity of this important book. I'd recommend this work anyone interested in history, taxes, politics, and/or economics and finance. This book will forever change the way I look at the (past, present, and future) world.
 
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dovetailer | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Oct 6, 2022 |
Surprisingly, the world is becoming more egalitarian. It always has been. Unsurprisingly, it takes a lot of blood sweat and tears for this to be so. It always has.
 
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albertgoldfain | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Oct 5, 2022 |
There was a lot of interesting stuff in this very short book. But the writing was hard to parse and get into. Would be interesting to read something that explored this stuff in more engaging prose.
 
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hamboardman | Hi ha 4 ressenyes més | Sep 24, 2022 |
This book was a major disappointment for me. After many years of intrigue in the title, I finally sat down to read it, and am unable to accept the author's portrayal of the data as reliable. As a matter of fact, I feel scammed after reading this book, and it makes me angry to get scammed, so I'm going to vent a little bit here because of it.

I couldn't get past the graphs. The graphs in this book are deceptive, and I don't just mean slightly; they are highly misleading!

If it wasn't already enough of a joke for the author to attempt to rationalize why it is that what appear as equal distances of time on a grid may range anywhere from ten to two hundred and fifty years, then surely presenting them in such fashion was done with comedic intent, and surely, the author knows much better than to habitually reference the same deceptive graphs, and draw conclusions for future hypotheses from them, especially since we've established that they are a joke in the first place! (You see, I'm being a bit sarcastic here - because that's what Pickory did!)

To read this book, you need to be able to accept the author's rationale for the seemingly skewed data, and look past the deception, i.e. ignore it, never notice it, etc., which I'd like to have been able to do because many of the author's conclusions surrounded my initial intrigue in the title, but I could not; given the title's popularity, I seem to be one of the very few unable to suspend disbelief in order to allow for a deceptive presentation of data to inform my conception of political economy, which is surprising...

Although I'm not entirely sure how complete or helpful much of the data the author draws from actually is, the real trouble isn't the data itself; it is how the researcher chose to present the data. It's not inaccurate or wrong; it's illusory and deceptive, sneaky-like, and the only reason I hesitate to call it all bollocks is because I'm not a British citizen, resident, or national; I feel sure, however, that the representations of data in this book are bollocks enough for anyone in the world to be able to call them out as such!

The imbalance of the graphs alone undermines any argument based upon them, and the red flag of statistical error confirming a sampler's bias is so flagrant and egregious that I wonder if it was done intentionally in order to undermine public intelligence, just to go ahead and nip a reasonable argument for a revolutionary mindset that could upset the status quo in the bud, so to speak; i.e. Plinkett's argument is simply too easily debunked and/or exploited; if I can point out the error, then anyone should be able...

So why was this book so esteemed? I don't know... I'd guess the ideas presented and drawn from the 'conclusions' must have already been devised, with the 'conclusions' themselves already reached, well before any data was examined; the book's popularity was likely ordained before any ink went onto paper, or any key was pressed to appear as a letter on a screen in contribution to the book. I wouldn't be surprised if the documentary film deal was already inked before a word was absorbed in alleged 'research,' much less put into print... and I'm really stretching it there... Honestly, I'm probably wrong about the latter, at very least, but possibly 'right enough' for it to behoove me to go ahead and throw it out there... Could it be? Yes! Was it? Who knows?

I know what you're thinking. You're thinking something along the lines of me belonging in the same sentence as a lexical item representing all that I am not, idiot, and be that as it may, I'm not saying that it's an overall awful book, simply one that bases many of its conclusions on faulty premises based on shoddy, conveniently manipulated, and often skewed presentations of data, i.e. one that should not have been published and/or should not have been taken seriously; there's a glass ceiling to the bogeyman in this book, and it's crystal clear!

It may be a rather good book. The author's conclusions, which I like, may hold on their own, and certainly aren't wrong; there's simply no fairly presented and reliable data to back most of them up; that's the troubling part... The author inundates us with data, and claims it is this trove of data that gives his work the edge over previous works in political economy; my reading of it tells me that the data itself hurts his argument more than it helps; he would have been better off not using any than so flagrantly manipulating what he had, and in turn, he gives us a textbook on how to manipulate data, so much so that I'd bet this book sells better as an example of what not to do in statistics classes than as a manual for what to do in political economy as we inch nearer to the close of the twenty first century. That is not to say that the gutless statistician won't find this an extremely useful manual.

Pickery, or whomever it is, tells us in the prologue, or introduction, somewhere, that the first chapters are for dummies, essentially, and writes that expert economists may skip these chapters; they are there to lay the groundwork for later chapters, and would be redundant for an economist. Despite many a credo to the contrary, I fashioned myself just shy of the professionalism required to skip the chapters (a dummy,) and after dropping my jaw in disbelief that so many pages could follow so many unreliable models presented to readers, I put the book down; if that stuff is redundant to an economist, then I'd bet the whole damned field is a scam! So, here's my confession: I get it.

Yay for me! When I say I get it, I mean that I know why Pikennen decided to manipulate the data like that, and it has nothing to do with all of that stuff he rationalizes to readers, i.e. censuses, historical events, etc.; he did it so that the data would form a bell curve, and to add insult to undermine the injury to the reader, he did it AFTER criticizing Malthusian economics, which should be more than criticized, and AFTER pointing to the bell curve as a blunder of sorts, a cash out, proper, to appease those with wealth, and perhaps, lacking understanding. Then, Plinko proceeds to grossly manipulate his data so that it forms a bell curve... Ironic? I'd guess not. Maybe since all of modern economic theory in the West is based on some unrealistic notion of self-regulating bell curves it was necessary, and is frequently so, for economists to manipulate their data to form one? Beats me... I don't know! The bottom line is that the data exploited to form many of the bell curves referenced in this work, doesn't form a bell curve at all! (If presented fairly) Maybe that's just the point...

Honest review: this book gave me a headache, was dry, and made me angry, yet I initially had trouble putting it down until after I kept seeing the same misleading graphs, and finally had enough. Thanks for letting me review! I feel much better now!

Public plea to defend my criticism of the author: Piccolo saw enough success on this book that my review won't hurt a thing, and he'll probably never read this, so he shouldn't get his feelings hurt by it... and not to make excuses for gaining relief by critique at the expense of his work, bear in mind that his work also contributed to causing the condition for which it is necessary to vent. Whew! Decent book! Not well argued. Good ideas! Nothing revolutionary. Deal with it!
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Reverend | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Aug 1, 2022 |
El camino hacia la igualdad es fruto de luchas y rebeliones contra la injusticia, y resultado de un proceso de aprendizaje de medidas institucionales y sistemas legales, sociales, fiscales y educativos que nos permitan hacer de la igualdad una realidad duradera. Desafortunadamente, este proceso a menudo se ve debilitado por la amnesia histórica, el nacionalismo intelectual y la compartimentación del conocimiento.

Thomas Piketty, economista francés y especialista en desigualdad económica, se dirige a un amplio público y presenta una síntesis que trasciende las fronteras nacionales y disciplinarias. El autor destaca una dimensión optimista porque, tal y como argumenta, hay un movimiento profundamente arraigado que conduce a una mayor igualdad.
 
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bibliotecayamaguchi | Hi ha 7 ressenyes més | Jul 22, 2022 |
Thomas Piketty looks at income and wealth inequality from a historic perspective that is more data driven than most analyses. Other than part 4, the book is largely apolitical. Piketty has political perspectives, and they come up occasionally in the first three part of the books, but he does not let ideology distract him from making an argument strongly rooted in historical data. He also does not push conclusions further than the data can bear. For example, most of his analysis is based on data from France, Britain, and the US since they have the best records over the last couple hundred years. He considers how far his conclusions can be applied to the rest of the world but makes it clear that the conclusions are not nearly as firm.

Because this is a detailed historical analysis, the book actually has only a few truly central takeaway points. The bulk of the text explains the implications of these takeaways and provides robust support for them.

One takeaway, which I consider the least important but start with because it is one of the most publicized, is that Piketty argues in part 4 that a global tax on capital is the most just way to control the increase of wealth inequality in the twenty-first century. He also, as is less publicized, notes explicitly that this is an ideal that likely can only be approximated right now. However, really understanding why he argues for a global tax on capital requires understanding the other key takeaways.

The second key takeaway--and if you remember only one, it is this--is that the mid-twentieth century was economically weird. We like to think that the growth in the mid-twentieth century was due to the growth in technology and productivity. Yet earlier periods of high growth in technology and productivity did not give such high levels of economic growth. And throughout most of human history, as far as we can tell, the economic growth rate was very low and dominated by demographic growth with no significant increase in per capita productivity. In particular, as far as we can tell, throughout most of history, the rate of return on capital was larger than the growth rate.

The mid-twentieth century inverted this logic. Rates of return on capital were approximately stable with overall averages of 4-5%. However, the rate of economic growth was quite high. When you look at economic data from before and after WWI and WWII, it is pretty clear that this growth is catch up growth making up for the massive economic destruction wrought by the two wars and the period between them. After that destruction, high demographic and productivity growth led to economic growth rates that were higher than the rate of return on capital. Thus, for a short period, it looked as if a world of theoretically meritocratic labor income would prevail over a world where capital, and especially inherited capital, dominated the upper levels of wealth and income.

The practical upshot of this is that any time economic data from the present is being compared to economic data from approximately 1950-1980, you should be suspicious. This is not a normative statement. The economic growth of the mid-twentieth century was great for the bulk of people whose income comes primarily from labor. But that period was not a new normal, it was making up for the destruction which came before. As an aside, for a similar reason, we should not assume that the huge economic growth that less economically rich countries are seeing is going to last forever or reflects some fundamental better way of doing things. Rather, much of this is due to demographic growth plus catch-up productivity growth.

The third key takeaway is that with economic growth rates slowing down again (to rates closer to 2% per year which is still historically high but lower than the mid-twentieth century), the average rate of return on capital once again exceeds the economic growth rate -- (r > g). This seemingly simple inequality has large implications for wealth and income inequality.

There are a couple ways to think about the implications of this inequality. First, consider a fixed stock of capital where all of the capital income is spent each year. When the economy is growing, the relative economic value of that capital income shrinks each year--is essence, the fortune is shrinking without shrinking. If the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate, this effect is slowed. The fortune still becomes worth relatively less over time, but the higher rate of return on capital means that the impact takes longer to be felt.

Now consider the situation where part of the capital income is reinvested each year. If (r g)--if the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate. In that case, the percentage invested can equal the growth rate, then the fortune keeps the same relative size as the economy grows. And if the amount reinvested is greater than the growth rate, then the fortune will grow relative to the growth of the economy. The larger the amount of total capital income someone is, the more likely they will be to be able to reinvest a larger percentage of it.

In plain English, when the rate of return on capital is greater than the economic growth rate, then it is likely that wealth will grow more quickly than the economy. Furthermore, the more that someone has, the easier it is for their wealth to grow at a greater rate. No matter how meritocratic the initial acquisition of wealth was, when the rate of return on capital is higher than economic growth, large amounts of capital tend to grow in ways that increase income inequality over time. The rich become richer and the poor become (relatively) poorer.

This cannot go on forever. If there is too much capital in the system, the rate of return will eventually fall because the marginal productivity of individual units of capital will decrease. However, there is no fundamental reason why this cannot continue until capital's share of income dwarfs labor's share of income.

This becomes even more worrisome given that wealth is (and always has been) very unequally distributed. Even in the rich countries studied (France, Britain, and the US), about half the population has no net wealth at all. Much of the rest has wealth mostly in the form of their primary residence. More liquid forms of wealth are concentrated in the upper echelons. Even within those upper echelons, the top 1% pulls far ahead of the next 9%, and the top 0.1% pulls far ahead of the rest of the top 1%. Combine this uneven distribution with the tendency of wealth to become more concentrated when the growth rate is low and you have a formula for the top of the wealth hierarchy to own a greater and greater percentage of total wealth, leaving less and less for everyone else.

Coming back to the first point, this is why Piketty proposes a global tax on wealth. The purpose of the tax is to try to provide a break on the spiral of inequality that is present when the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate. Without some brake--whether this or something else--odds are high that capital will become increasingly concentrated because of structural reasons (rather than because of any inherit skill in investing and innovation on the part of the owners of capital).

So remember, the mid-twentieth century was weird and the world of wealth inequality we are returning to is one that seems to represent a natural outcome of the forces of capital growth and economic growth if intentional checks are not put in place. Market forces are not enough to fix this without the aid of political will to disrupt the mechanisms of wealth divergence.
 
Marcat
eri_kars | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Jul 10, 2022 |
Minden korszaknak megvannak a maga Nagy Könyvei, amiket kevesen olvasnak, de mindenki hivatkozik rájuk – ilyen volt Fukuyama és Huntington klasszikusa, Marx Tőkéje, vagy épp a Biblia. No most szerintem a „XXI. század Nagy Könyve” megtisztelő titulusra idáig Pikettynek van a legnagyobb esélye. Nem laikusoknak való olvasmány, ezt én, mint laikus mondom: hosszas fejtegetéseit tőke/jövedelem arányának változásairól, alsó és felső decilisek és centilisek eltéréseiről és ezek jelentőségéről gyakran inkább csak érteni véltem, mint értettem, és bizony mondom néktek: még úgy sem volt élvezetes magamba szívni őket, hogy közben kiültem a teraszra napozni, és bontottam egy meggyes radlert. Persze az alapmondanivaló végtelenül világos, egy mondatban összefoglalható (következésképpen nem kell hozzá átrágni magunkat a könyvön, elég, ha elolvasunk egy recenziót, vagy esetleg ezt az értékelést): minden jel arra mutat, hogy a közhiedelemmel ellentétben az anyagi egyenlőtlenség a világban egyáltalán nem csökken, sőt. Nő. (Így viszont már két mondat.)

Ennek bizonyításra Piketty beveti a teljes arzenált: adatok, kimutatások, táblázatok, Jane Austen és Balzac regények… amit csak akartok, sőt, egy kicsit több. Legfőbb irányszáma a tőke/jövedelem arány, ugyanis értelmezésében a jövedelem nem árul el eleget az egyenlőtlenségről, sokkal érdemesebb tehát a tőke, vagyis (némi egyszerűsítéssel) a vagyon felől megközelíteni a kérdést*. Merthogy a vagyon ugye öröklés útján halmozódik (különösen egy demográfiailag csökkenő népesség esetén), ráadásul a nagy vagyonok hozamai többnyire magasabbak, mint a gazdasági fejlődés üteme. A vagyoni egyenlőtlenség anno a XX. század elején tetőzött, egészen extrém különbségeket hozva létre ember és ember között – ám egyszer csak bekopogott a Történelem ajtaján az első világháború (jó, talán inkább berúgta az ajtót), és hopp, a nagy öröklött vagyonok jó része elértéktelenedett, a vállalatok csődbe, a járadékosok pedig tönkrementek. Mire nem jó egy háború, ugye? Ez a relatív egyenlőség egész sokáig kitartott, nagyjából a hetvenes évek végéig, többek között azért, mert a páratlan gazdasági fellendülés Európában magasabb növekedési ütemet tudott produkálni, mint a vagyonok hozamai, és a hidegháború miatt erős egyenlősítő szociális programokat működtettek az államok azért, hogy polgáraik nehogy szovjetizálják magukat. Azonban a gazdasági növekedés egyszer csak behúzta a kéziféket, és feltűntek a színen a neokonzervatív közgazdászok, hogy Hayek nyomán átszabják kicsit a jóléti rendszereket – és ennek következtében a nyolcvanas évektől kezdve az egyenlőtlenségek megint robbanásszerű növekedésnek indultak, és mára már szinte elérték az 1910-es szintet**. És még hol van a vége, ugye.

A legérdekesebb mindazonáltal az utolsó száz oldal (sajnálhatja is, aki eddig már falhoz csapta a művet), ahol Piketty felvázol egy stratégiát, amivel kezelni lehet a helyzetet – vagy ahogy ő fogalmaz, visszahódítani a kapitalizmust a demokrácia számára, mert eléggé kezdenek eltávolodni egymástól. A progresszív (többkulcsos) jövedelemadót nem érzi elégségesnek, ezen felül brutális progresszív örökösödési adót, illetve progresszív vagyonadót tartana üdvösnek. Persze azzal is tisztában van, hogy a kőgazdagoknak szokása anyagi javaikat különböző adóparadicsomok bankszektorában elrejteni a magasabb hazai adókulcsok elől – biztos úgy vannak vele, nekik nem kell finanszírozni saját államuk jóléti rendszereit, hisz ők anélkül is elég jól élnek. (Amiről eszembe jut, bár nem tartozik szorosan ide, hogy rendszeresen látok itt a Hűvösvölgyben parkolni egy szlovák rendszámú kék Ferrarit.) Erre a problémára egy globális banki adatszolgáltatási kötelezettséget, illetve globális vagyonadót gondol orvosságnak, és érvel is ezek megvalósíthatósága mellett – akár még azon az áron is, hogy ez nagy feszültséghez vezet a Svájchoz hasonló renitensekkel szemben, akik hajlamosak felmondani a nemzetközi szolidaritást, csak hogy a többiek kárára magukhoz csalogassák a zsíros milliárdokat. Persze hogy mindez gazdaságilag mennyire racionális, abban nem merek nyilatkozni, de látni kell, hogy ez szinte másodlagos: Piketty fejtegetései ugyanis (állításainak helyességétől függetlenül) olyan politikai muníciót szolgáltathatnak a progresszív (talán populista) baloldalnak, amit az zászlajára tűzhet, és felveheti a versenyt az egyre inkább nacionalista-szuverenista színezetet öltő jobboldallal. Már ha sikerül ennek a baloldalnak ezt a 700 oldalt értelmezhető jelszavakká desztillálni.

Bizonyára nem hibátlan fejtegetés, de attól a tény még tény marad: ez a könyv megkerülhetetlen – legyél akármilyen irányultságú közgazdász, egész egyszerűen muszáj manapság valahogy viszonyulnod Piketty téziseihez. (Még én is viszonyulok valahogy – pedig hol vagyok én közgazdász?) Arról nem is beszélve, hogy ugye itt vannak ezek a neokonzervatív közgazdászok***, akik annak idején azzal robbantak be, hogy drasztikus varázsszert kínáltak a jóléti állam betegségeire: azt állították, hogy ha azzal élénkítjük a gazdaságot, hogy a szociális juttatások helyett a vagyonosoknál hagyjuk a pénzt, akkor az vissza fog gyűrűzni a társadalomba, és előbb-utóbb a szegényeknek is jut a kaviárból. Piketty monstrumja elég meggyőzően szaggatja szét ezt az illúziót, jelezve, ebből a gyakorlatban alig valósult meg valami, cserébe viszont megágyazott az orbitális egyenlőtlenségeknek. Ráadásul a neokonzervatív idea még a gazdaságot se pörgette fel úgy, ahogy várták, talán mert a vagyon jelentős része ebben a folyamatban a pénzügyi körforgásból kivont improduktív tőke – csak arra jó, hogy pár Dagobert bácsi üldögélhessen egy kupac aranyon. És azt se felejtsük, hogy – ha hihetünk Balzac Goriot apójának – a nagy egyenlőtlenségek az innováció szempontjából is ártalmasak, mert nem arra késztetik a társadalom nagy részét, hogy keményen dolgozzon és fejlődjön, hátha feljebb jut, sokkal inkább arra, hogy ügyeskedni kell, hízelegni a szupergazdagoknak, és ha egy mód van rá, elvenni valamelyik csilliárdos randa lányát. Minden összevetve tehát Piketty hosszú évek óta az első erős, karakteres progresszív állítást**** tette le az asztalra.

Mindazonáltal a csillagozáshoz nem érzem elég kompetensnek magam – nem tisztem eldönteni, hogy Piketty állításainak igazságai egy, három, vagy öt csillagot érnek-e. (Bár bevallom, én hiszek neki.) Ráadásul olyan szakadékot érzek e könyv élvezeti értéke és tartalmi súlya között, amit egy pórias osztályozással nem vagyok képes áthidalni. Szóval ez egy tiszletetteljes csillagtalanság. És annyira boldog vagyok, hogy holnap nem kell már olvasnom ezt a könyvet, hogy azt el se tudom mondani.

* ”A nagyságrendek érzékeltetésére előzetes példaként nézzük a következőket: a lakosság legnagyobb munkajövedelemmel bíró 10%-a általában a munkajövedelmek 25-30%-ával rendelkezik, míg a legnagyobb vagyonnal bíró 10% vagyona mindig meghaladja az összvagyon 50%-át, sőt, egyes társadalmakban ez akár a 90%-ot is elérheti.” (262. oldal)
** Bár ezt az egyenlőséget némiképp enyhíti, hogy most a két véglet (hipergazdagok és hiperszegények) között egy vastagabb középosztály teng-leng.
*** Mely neokonzervatív közgazdászokat a szerző szőrmentén meg is gyanúsítja azzal, hogy erős érdekek fűzik őket azokhoz a milliárdosokhoz, akiket véletlenül épp megvédenek érveikkel a progresszív adózástól. Ami vagy igaz, vagy nem, mindenesetre nem túl elegáns módszer arra, hogy eleve hiteltelenítsük a lehetséges ellenvéleményeket.
**** És tegyük hozzá: a jellemzően angolszászok uralta közgazdászszakmán belül a kevés kontinentális európai válasz is, aminek szintén lehet üzenete.
 
Marcat
Kuszma | Hi ha 72 ressenyes més | Jul 2, 2022 |