Impressive and timely survey of how airpower shaped modern warfare, and also its limitations (against guerilla forces, say). It is incredibly tempting to think that airpower is a means of accomplishing objectives with a minimal effort, but in its present form, it cannot do everything on its own. Let us hope our modern generals take van Creveld's lessons to heart in Libya. ( )

Martin Van Creveld is one of the world's best writers about military technology. His account of the impact of communication technology on military leadership remains unsurpassed. His military expertise is marred by his Dr. Strangelove views on casualties and women. This book does not disappoint in its number of outrageous statements. While the cry for more Western casualties is echoed by many a chickenhawk (US specimens are invariably flabby), the desire to return to a pre-Tailhook airforce labels him as a dinosaur. One of the key influences of technology is that it reduces gender differences. Women may not carry as heavy loads as men but they can push buttons just as fast if not faster.

The book is divided into five parts. The first two parts give a traditional account of the rise of air power up to the end of the Second World War. Part III is devoted to the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America that saw the development of intercontinental missiles, jets and helicopters. Playing in the big league was and is so expensive that one after the other powers dropped out of the game, until only the United States of America retains the means to project power to any place on the planet. "Missiles, satellites, and drones" (the title of the eleventh chapter) promise to relieve some of the financial stress - at the cost of allowing other players to re-enter the game. I wish van Creveld had elaborated more on the experience and potential of drones in modern warfare. Instead, he stops with the already classic account of the looming end of manned fighting aircrafts. The democratizing effect of technology will devalue today's fighter jets, these technological marvels, just like armored knights were slain by humble pikes, bows and guns. The big intellectual gap in this book is the lack of a definition what constitutes air power and its different forms. The author should have assembled his different statements about air power into a coherent framework. In my interpretation, air power can interdict and destroy, but has limited ability to hold and control. Organizationally, these would mean a relegation of the airforce into a support function. Pilots will be the 21st century's train stokers.

Part IV and V deal with the smaller wars (IV: Little Wars 1945-2010) and imperialistic engagements (V: War amongst the People 1945-2010). These parts suffer from their close linkage to the Cold War. While the US and the Soviets did not go to war directly, their pilots manned the aircrafts in their proxy wars. Instead of a consistent framework, the author presents a mix which is further complicated by the fact that many of the Little Wars were also wars amongst peoples. The author's focus on the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, Western powers leads to a silence about the wars among the poor. Africa and South America appear mostly in a colonial setting. The air element of the War on Drugs and the endless African civil wars might have been interesting topics for van Creveld's part V.

In sum, a readable introduction to the history of warfare in the air with a and from a US focus. It elegantly shows the costly futility in investing in manned aircraft but only hints at the power of the now quarter-century-old development of drones. ( )