While Ken Ford might not be Osprey's best contributor his battle studies are always at least workmanlike and this booklet is no exception. In particular, Ford does make clear that the British failure in this battle was very much a failure of command and control, as there was a general lack of trust and respect among the British flag-grade commanders that contributed to the defeat; never mind the issues with doctrine and style of warfare that were pervasive in the 8th Army. To put it another way, while Bernard Montgomery might be criticized for his "tidy" and over-controlled style of battle there was more than enough evidence in 1942 that the average British general could not handle initiative. Apart from that this book being a decade old means that a lot of new scholarship on the British way of war is not reflected in the biography, which even at the time of publishing was a little bit dated. "Monty's Men" by John Buckley is a good survey of the new literature. ( )

Nel maggio del 1942 la Panzerarmee Afrika al comando del generale Erwin Rommel, la "Volpe del deserto", attaccò le fortificazioni britanniche della Linea di Gazala. Il comandante tedesco inflisse gravi perdite alle truppe britanniche, con migliaia di uomini uccisi o fatti prigionieri. Questo volume offre un'analisi della figura di Rommel nel momento in cui ricacciò indietro l'Ottava Armata britannica fino a El Alamein, luogo dell'ultima resistenza. ( )